Pace International Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 2 Summer 2015

Article 1

July 2015

A Theorization on Equity: Tracing Causal Responsibility for
Missing Iraqi Antiquities and Piercing Official Immunity
Robert Bejesky

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law
Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert Bejesky, A Theorization on Equity: Tracing Causal Responsibility for Missing Iraqi
Antiquities and Piercing Official Immunity, 27 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 397 (2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

ROBERTBEJESKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/14/2015 4:38 PM

A THEORIZATION ON EQUITY:
TRACING CAUSAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR MISSING
IRAQI ANTIQUITIES AND
PIERCING OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Robert Bejesky*
I. Introduction
II. U.S. Obligations and Laws on Antiquities
A. Recognition of the Problem from Historical Experience
B. International Law Protections During Warfare
C. More Recent Prohibitions on Transfer
and Domestic Laws
III. Events in Iraq
A. Chronology of Looting Following Invasion
B. Explanations for the Cause of Looting
C. Warnings Made Looting More Foreseeable
IV. Sovereign and Official Immunities
A. The Scenario
B. The Substantive Claim Under International Level
1. Crimes Against Humanity
2. Ambiguity within the Contentious Case Precedent
3. Extraterritoriality and Wars of Aggression
4. The 2003 Invasion of Iraq
C. Domestic Level: Public Policy and Comity
1. Official Immunities and the FTCA/FELRTCA
2. Execution of Constitutional War Powers
in the 2003 Invasion
V. Concluding Analysis

397

1

ROBERTBEJESKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

398

PACE INT’L L. REV.

7/14/2015 4:38 PM

[Vol. XXVII::2

I. INTRODUCTION
Three weeks after the U.S.-led attack on Iraq, looters descended on the artifacts in the Iraq National Museum. Over
ten thousand pieces were assumed destroyed or stolen,1 and
the Coalition Provisional Authority estimated the losses at $12
2
billion. The gravity of the privation led the Security Council
to include language in Resolution 1483 to restrict countries
from trading in Iraq’s pillaged antiquities, and the U.S. Congress passed the Emergency Protection of Iraqi Cultural An3
tiquities Act of 2004 to enforce the measures. Several thou4
sand pieces were recovered, but thousands remain missing. In
March 2013, Hussein ash-Shamri, the head of the Iraqi Interior
Ministry’s Economic Crimes Department, announced that Iraq
opened 39 cases against countries to investigate circumstances
surrounding the missing archaeological treasures to procure
5
their return.

* M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan),
LL.M. International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught international
law courses for Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at
the University of Michigan, American Government and Constitutional Law
courses for Alma College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami.
1
PAOLO BRUSASCO, LOOTING THE PAST: SYRIA’S CULTURAL HERITAGE
UNDER ATTACK: ANOTHER IRAQ? 28 (2012) (reporting that an estimated 15,000
items were stolen from the museum and 20,000 objects were vandalized);
Lindsay E. Willis, Looting in Ancient Mesopotamia: A Legislation Scheme for
the Protection of Iraq’s Cultural Heritage, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 221, 22728 (2005) (noting that fifteen to seventeen thousand items were looted or destroyed).
2 JAMES DOBBINS, SETH G. JONES, BENJAMIN RUNKLE & SIDDHARTH
MOHANDAS, OCCUPYING IRAQ: A HISTORY OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY 111 (2009).
3
Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2004 Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108- 429, §§
3001-3003, 118 Stat. 2599 (2004).
4 US Illegally Obtained and Kept Thousands of Iraq’s Cultural Treasures,
RT (Apr. 9, 2013, 9:15 AM), http://rt.com/op-edge/iraq-war-cultural-artifacts553/; Mathew Bogdanos, Fighting for Iraq’s Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2007, at A21 (reporting 6,000 pieces recovered).
5 Margarita Kislova, Iraq Files Lawsuits Over Valuables Seized in 2003,
RUSSIAN LEGAL INFORMATION AGENCY (Mar. 13, 2013, 6:13 PM),
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This article tenders a suppositional analysis of culpability
for the pilferage of the artifacts. Culpability standards are first
assessed by using Part II’s précis of the substantive international law that safeguards antiquities. Part III provides a factual chronology of the looting to address the responsibility of
Iraqis who engaged in looting after law and order collapsed and
the obligations of invading/occupying military forces during the
stages of jus ad bellum and jus post bellum. The Iraqi government presumably would prefer an equitable remedy that facilitates the return of missing artifacts if the items are located and
identified; this would implicate any state that failed to halt
black market trades. However, if items are certified as missing
and cannot be located within a reasonable period of time or
were destroyed during the looting, should there be a right to
recover damages against actors who transgressed substantive
law and impelled the sequence of events into motion that led to
losses? Considering this prospect, Part IV offers a conjectural
analysis of liability. It is hypothetical because the Iraqi government may have divided political will (which might necessitate a qui tam-like public interest action), it is novel to pierce
the veil of official immunity in the context posed, the analysis
extrapolates offenses that have previously eliminated official
immunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity in a
tort-like derivative civil action, and the inquiry entails pitting
factual analyses against heuristics and the presumption that
collateral losses can be absolved if ends justifies the means.
II. U.S. OBLIGATIONS AND LAWS ON ANTIQUITIES
A. Recognition of the Problem from Historical Experience
Looting of valuables has a distant history and has served
as a method of amassing wealth, compensating soldiers,6 extirpating extant society and culture, and subjugating a besieged
http://rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20130313/266703432.html.
6 See Patty Gerstenblith, From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the
Preservation of Cultural Heritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 37
GEO. J. INT’L L. 245, 249-50 (2006).

3
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population.7 Large-scale looting transferred possession of valuable Egyptian property during the mid-twelfth century B.C.
period; such thefts were prevalent through the Roman and
8
Greek eras of domination. More recent examples include British thefts in colonial India and Egypt, and Napoleon’s armies
looted treasures in Egypt, Italy, Germany, and Russia.9 Napoleon’s haul was so copious that the French briefly renamed the
Louvre Museum the “Musée Napoleon.”10
The Musée Napoleon became the largest museum in Europe. At the time, France considered the wartime thefts a lawful policy that could transfer legitimate title to the acquisitions.11
The Allies placed considerable responsibility on
German plunder during World War II and some of the cultural
property was recovered, but restoration of antiquities deriving
from earlier heists have not been so successful.12
The underlying angst that results when a country of origin
losing possession of a valuable antiquity is of profound privation to that state’s national identity, culture, history and

7 See Margaret M. Miles, Art as Plunder: The Ancient Origins of Debate
About Cultural Property 39-40 (2008).
8 Leonard D. DuBoff, Sherri burr & Michael d. Murray, Art Law: Cases
and Materials 533 (revised ed. 2010); See generally Miles, supra note 7.
9 See David Nicholls, Napoleon: A Biographical Companion 79 (1999);
Cecil Gould, Trophy of Conquest: The Musee Napoleon and the Creation of
the Louvre 41-43 (1965); John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological
Ethics and the Reparation Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part
Two), 28 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 1, 16-20, 98-99 (2004); See,e.g., Vivek
K. Hatti, Note, India’s Right to Reclaim Cultural and Art Treasures from
Britain Under International Law, 32 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 465
(2000); See also Dorothy Mackay Quynn, The Art Confiscations of the Napoleonic Wars, 50 Am. Hist. Rev. 437 (1945).
10 See, e.g., Diana Reid Haig, Walks Through Napoleon and Josephine’s
Paris 123 (2004).
11 See generally Gould, supra note 9; Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 25152; Cohan, supra note 9, at 16-17; Stephen Wilske, International Law and the
Spoils of War: To the Victor the Right of Spoils? 3 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign
Aff. 223, 227-29 (1998) (Napoleon sought to constitute a colossal museum).
12 NOAH CHARNEY, STEALING THE MYSTIC LAMB: THE TRUE STORY OF THE
WORLD’S MOST COVETED MASTERPIECE 100 (2010) (noting one estimate is that
about half of Napoleon’s thefts were returned to original owners); Cohan, supra note 9, at 81, 90, 95-96.
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wealth,13 which is a menace to the preservation of all cultures
and peoples. An item can be stolen, sold on the black market,
and yield shocking profits to the thief and subsequent purchasers.14 It may be a formidable difficulty for the owner to reacquire the item if it is sold in a jurisdiction that will not enforce
a foreign judgment that represents a genuine title of ownership,15 particularly if a bona fide purchaser acquired the item.16
Trade in stolen antiquities is recognized as such a grave problem17 that sources estimated between eighty and ninety-five
percent of antiquities on the market lack sufficient documentation of origin.18 Moreover, if states remain taciturn, or worse,
strive to profit from their nationals’ engagement in the private
sale of stolen artifacts, the injection of commercialization and
wealth motivation may belittle the intrinsic value of archaeological treasures.19

13 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, in
THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL
PROPERTY, ART AND LAW 24, 52-59 (2000); Cohan, supra note 9, at 4 (stating
that “looting destroys not only cultural sites but also the heritage of cultural
groups.”).
14
Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed
Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 409-11 (1995).
15
Cohan, supra note 9, at 64.
16
BARBARA T. HOFFMAN, ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY, AND
PRACTICE 90 (2006); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v.
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1393-94 (S.D. Ind.
1989) (choice of law questions can be complex); Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1153 (2d Cir. 1982) (referencing complex
chain of title and origin questions).
17
Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some
Skeptical Observations, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 217 (2007); Marion P. Forsyth,
International Cultural Property Trusts: One Response to Burden of Proof
Challenges in Stolen Antiquities Litigation, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 197 (2007).
18
Kimberly L. Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves: Organized Crimes and
the Illicit Antiquities Trade, 45 IND. L. REV. 601, 620 (2012); Geoff Edgers,
Treasure Hunt: For Antiquities Experts, the Chase is on to Recover the Relics
Looted From Iraq’s National Museum, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 15, 2003,
http://www.boston.com/news/packages/iraq/globe_stories/041503_museum.ht
m.
19
John Henry Merryman, The Free International Movement of Cultural
Property, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 1, 13 (1998). This belittlement of the
intrinsic value could conceivably even be the case when titles are genuine and
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B. International Law Protections During Warfare
Given that the mass theft of artifacts historically occurred
during combat (as countries under siege are most vulnerable
and less capable of safeguarding antiquities), early international law prohibitions on the pilferage and destruction of artifacts developed as components of humanitarian protections in
treaties governing warfare.
The U.S. is a party to applicable Conventions20 and the
universal acceptance of the Geneva Conventions makes the
21
rules customary international law.
The U.S. had also promulgated many of the safeguards for valuables earlier in the Civil War-era Instruction for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field (“Lieber Code”). The Lieber Code
differentiates works of art, museum property, and educational
institution property as effects that should not be destroyed or
22
The Lieber Code imposes
looted during combat operations.
commitments on the aggressor to protect – and not steal – cultural items,23 and affixes obligations on the invaded country to
reasonably secure items and locations.24
Article 27 of the 1907 Convention on Law and Customs of
War on Land states “In sieges and bombardments, all neces-

there is systematized international trade in antiquities.
20
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, May
14, 1954, available at http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=
13637&language=E&order=alpha (listing the U.S. as a party).
21
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, LIBYA: FROM REPRESSION TO REVOLUTION 297
(2013) (noting that the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are customary international law); GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES 34 (2012).
22
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
IN THE FIELD GENERAL ORDER NO. 100 (The Lieber Code), arts. 31-36 (Apr. 24,
1863), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp.
23
Id. at art. 36 (“In no case shall [cultural objects of an adversary] be
sold or given away, if captured by the armies of the United States, nor shall
they ever be privately appropriated.”).
24
Id. at art. 35 (“Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or
precious instruments . . . must be secured against all avoidable injury, even
when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.”).
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sary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings
dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, [and]
historic monuments . . . provided they are not being used at the
25
time for military purposes.” Article 56 states “All seizure of,
destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbid26
den, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings.”
This rule is affirmed in the U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10,27
with the exception of military necessity, which balances the
right to weaken opposing military forces to achieve victory with
obligations to strictly sustain humanitarian rights.28
International agreements were not only consummated to
govern warfare with provisions that protect cultural heritage,
but nations have also adopted international agreements to exclusively protect cultural heritage and artifacts in the event of
armed combat.29 In 1954, the United Nations Educational Sci-

25 Convention (IV) Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land art.
27, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T. S. 277 (entered into force Jan.
26, 1910) [hereinafter Convention IV].
26 Id. at art. 56.
27 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, para. 405(a), July 18, 1956 (revised July 15, 1976), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law_warfare-1956.pdf.
28 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 6(a)(b), Mar. 26, 1999,
38 I.L.M. 769 (stating that cultural property can be destroyed when “cultural
property has, by its function, been made into a military objective” and “there
is no feasible alternative available to obtain a similar military advantage.”);
Convention IV, supra note 25, art. 27 (providing for a military necessity exception). Shortly after the Lieber Code was adopted, the Declarations of St.
Petersburg in 1868 articulated that the legitimate objectives of states during
warfare are to weaken the military forces of the enemy to the degree necessary. Symposium, The International Responses to the Environmental Impacts
of War, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 565, 570-71 (2005); Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868.
29 An initial step was taken in 1935 when several countries in the Western Hemisphere, including the US, signed the Treaty for the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments. Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments, Apr. 15, 1935, 49
Stat. 3267, 167 L.N.T.S. 289 (entered into force Aug. 26, 1935). Countries
signing the Treaty for the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions

7
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entific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) sponsored the
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, which protects cultural property
during military conflict and occupation.30 The Convention requires parties to “safeguard” and “prevent destruction or damage [to cultural property] in the event of armed conflict,”31 and
expresses the universality of the offense by affirming that
“damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind.”32
The Convention proscribes the attacker from using, taking, or
destroying cultural property unless “military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver,” and requires parties to “prohibit,
prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed
against, cultural property.”33 The defender must also secure
cultural property in all forms of military combat, which includes affixing recognizable symbols to mark cultural sites.34
With respect to obstructing the transfer of valuable items,
and Historic Monuments were required “(1) to respect cultural property and
the persons engaged in its protection; (2) to adopt a special emblem that
guarantees protection; (3) to adopt a special emblem to identify cultural institutions, and the application of such emblems; [and] (4) to register or prepare
a list of protected cultural institutions.” KIFLE JOTE, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 52 (1994).
30 The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 539 [hereinafter “Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property”] (defining cultural property as
“(a) moveable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people . . . (b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to
preserve or exhibit the moveable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph
(a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives . . . [and] (c)
centers containing a large amount of cultural property.”)
31 Id. at arts. 3, 4.
32 Id. at art. 11.
33 Id. at art. 4.
34 Id. at arts, 3, 17; Victoria A. Birov, Prize or Plunder?: The Pillage of
Works of Art and the International Law of War, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
201, 213-14 (1998). When the Hague Convention was adopted, there may
have been more uncertainty over the location of cultural locations across the
world, but with more information, international cooperation, and the mass
media, it is more difficult to assert ignorance with respect to well-known locations of cultural property.
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the First Protocol of the 1954 Convention also requires occupiers to prevent the export of cultural property, secure and return any removed cultural property, and compensate the owner
and good faith purchasers for an occupier’s violation of these
fiduciary responsibilities.35 The international community may
not have strictly observed or implemented these obligations because over a hundred countries ratified the 1954 Hague Convention’s First Protocol without decisively acting to prohibit the
36
trade of cultural objects taken from an occupied territory.
However, in 2003, Iraq may have been the first manifest chal37
lenge to the provisions.
There are 113 state parties to the 1954 Hague Conven38
39
tion, and the U.S. signed but never ratified the Convention.
Signing without ratifying a treaty still requires the signatory to
not defeat the “object and purpose” of the treaty.40 Recent U.S.

35 Protocol to the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict para. 1(4), May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
36 Patty Gerstenblith, Protecting Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict:
Looking Back, Looking Forward, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 677,
688 (2009).
37 See Draft Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill, 2007-8, H.C. Bill
[693]
(Gr.
Brit.),
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmcumeds/693/
693.pdf (providing the British Parliament with a draft cultural property bill
that criminalized certain offenses in the Hague Convention) ; See also Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-429, §§
3001-3003 (2004) (U.S. law reacting to pilfered antiquities in Iraq). There
was no long-term occupation of a country with abundant cultural artifacts
and perhaps no comparable large-scale pillage during warfare after 1954 until the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and many countries did take measures to enforce prohibitions on the trade of Iraq’s cultural heritage after the 2003 invasion.
38 Wayne Sandholtz, The Iraqi National Museum and International Law:
A Duty to Protect, 44 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 185, 238 (2005).
39 Id. at 229, 232; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect
for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 175,
182-83 (2005).
40
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty when . . . it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, ac-
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presidents have affirmed intentions to comply with the treaty’s
requirements41 and scholars have called the principles that require protection of cultural property customary international
42
Elevated obligations could also exist if a state perpelaw.
trates an illegal invasion and destroys or fails to preserve civilian property in violation of jus in bello rules.43
C. More Recent Prohibitions on Transfer and Domestic Laws
Members of the international community have adopted
conventions to forbid the theft and illegal trade of cultural
property in all contexts, and this principle exists in national
laws. In 1970, UNESCO implemented the Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export,
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.44 The Convention bans the illegal trade and wrongful assertion of ownership of cultural property;45 it pronounces that cultural property
“constitutes one of the basic elements of civilization and national culture,” and affirms “its true value can only be appreci-

ceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty”).
41 Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 232-33.
42 Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 299-300, 302, 304-05; Birov, supra note
34, at 225-26 (noting that “[m]any of the provisions of the 1954 Hague Convention . . . are rapidly achieving the universally binding standard of customary international law”); See generally Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Legal Regime for Protecting Cultural Property During Armed Conflict, 42 A.F. L. REV.
277 (1997).
43 See generally DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 196 (Adam Roberts &
Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000); see also Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 97 Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (setting terms for the preservation of property taken
during internment of civilian populations).
44
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970,
823 U.N.T.S. 231, 10 I.L.M. 289.
45
Id. at art. 3, 823 U.N.T.S. at 236 (prohibiting the “import, export or
transfer of ownership of cultural property”); Id. at art. 14, 823 U.N.T.S. at
244 (preventing “illicit export;” requiring that State Parties “provide the national services responsible for the protection of its cultural heritage with an
adequate budget . . .”).
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ated in relation to the fullest possible information regarding its
origin, history and traditional setting.”46
In 1972, the World Heritage Convention was adopted and
its more than 190 members are required “not to take any deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the
cultural and natural heritage . . . situated on the territory of
47
In addition, the
other States Parties to the Convention.”
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of 1995 is a self-executing treaty that established
48
Shortly
rules for states to return stolen cultural property.
thereafter, UNESCO adopted an international code of ethics for
49
professional traders in cultural property.
The importance of preserving archaeological sites with
50
Many countries,
domestic laws garners expansive support.
including the U.S. and Iraq, have domestic laws that vest all
rights to antiquities and cultural property in their countries
and proscribe the extraction of those valuables with criminal
penalties.51 The U.S. enacted the Antiquities Act of 1906 to

46

Id. at preface, 823 U.N.T.S. at 232.
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, arts. 6 & 16, Nov. 18, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226
(1972).
48
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects art. 1, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1330; Lyndel V. Prott, UNESCO AND
UNIDROIT: A PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN CULTURAL OBJECTS
(Norman
Palmer
ed.,
1998),
available
at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/articles/s7
0-prott-1996-e.pdf (providing comparisons with the UNESCO and UNIDROIT
protections).
49 UNESCO International Code of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property
art.
1
(1999),
available
at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001213/121320M.pdf
(“Professional
traders in cultural property will not import, export or transfer the ownership
of this property when they have reasonable cause to believe it has been stolen, illegally alienated, clandestinely excavated or illegally exported.”).
50 Derek R. Kelly, Note, Illegal Tender: Antiquities Protection and U.S.
Import Restrictions on Cypriot Coinage, 34 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 491, 525
(2009) (noting that a recent Harris Poll discovered that 96% of Americans
prefer archaeological sites to be protected with laws).
51 Willis, supra note 1, at 235-36 (offering examples of Greece, China,
Iraq, and Mexico).
47
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protect federal land from theft, vandalism, unauthorized excavation, and to impose penalties.52 Further, it passed the National Stolen Property Act of 1948, which sanctions prosecuting
individuals for transacting in the trade of stolen foreign antiq53
uities. In 1979, Congress adopted the Archaeological Resources Protection Act to further fortify the policies underlying
54
the Antiquities Act of 1906. In 1983, the U.S. became a party
to the UNESCO Convention and enacted the Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act, which requires the U.S.
Department of State to collaborate with other countries to restrict the transport and import of stolen artifacts into the
55
U.S.
In addition to existing international law, Iraq has long had
comprehensive retention laws that affirm sovereign public
rights over all archaeological sites, materials, and artifacts as
national property56 and those rules were applicable during the
2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Rules were not heeded and enforced and antiquities disappeared as a result. Relevant actors
to the events leading to losses include the U.S., either due to
the White House’s order of an invasion that displaced domestic
security forces or the U.S. military’s failure to secure antiquities; the vandals and thieves who destroyed and appropriated
cultural property; Iraqi authorities that may not have adequately protected valuables; individuals who may have traded
in or possessed stolen antiquities; or states that have obliga-

The Antiquities Act of 1906,16 U.S.C. §§ 431-33.
National Stolen Property Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
54 Archeological Resource Protection Act, Pub. L. 96-95 as amended, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a-470m. The law has been enforced on offenders. See,
e.g., United States v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 333
F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5 th Cir.
1979).
55 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97446, 96 Stat. 2329 (1983), codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-13 (2012) (a list of
Members
of
the
Convention
is
available
at
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E&order=al
pha).
56 Cohan, supra note 9, at 51-53, 67-68 (noting that Iraq’s laws were
adopted in 1936).
52
53
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tions to obstruct the trade in stolen cultural property. However, unless individual items are identified or an evidence trail is
ascertained, obligations of the latter two actors are inconclusive and might still be contingent on the reasonableness of preceding acts that created a black market. Consequently, Part III
will concentrate on the former three actors by evaluating the
chronology surrounding the looting of the Iraq National Museum.
III. EVENTS IN IRAQ
A. Chronology of Looting Following Invasion
On April 6, 2003, the Pentagon announced that the start of
the Baghdad portion of the war plan. U.S. aircraft began 24hour patrols over the city, U.S. tanks and armored vehicles
moved in to control the ground,57 and the military began to secure areas in Baghdad over the next three days without resistance.58 On April 10, Major General Buford Blount, commander of the Third Infantry Division, announced “Not every
area in Baghdad is secure . . . But the central part of the city,
the heart of the city, is secure.”59
Virtually concomitant with Pentagon announcements that
60
Baghdad was secure, chaos, looting, and arson began.
Prior

57
Battles
Rage
in
Baghdad,
CNN
(Apr.
6,
2003)
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/05/sprj.irq.war.main/index.html.
58 Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 186.
59 Michael Smith, The Allies’ Next Key Objective is to Win the Peace, THE
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 10, 2003), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
northamerica/usa/1427203/The-allies-next-key-objective-is-to-win-thepeace.html; Street Celebrations in Some Iraqi Cities, ABC NEWS (Apr. 9,
2003),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2003-04-09/street-celebrations-in-someiraqi-cities/1833402 (reporting that “US tanks have swept into Baghdad with
little resistance”).
60 Iraq Timeline: July 16, 1979 to January 31, 2004, THE GUARDIAN,
http://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/page/0,12438,793802,00.html (stating that
there was purportedly only euphoria from locals); Online Newshour, Baghdad Report, PBS (Apr. 10, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/militaryjan-june03-baghdad_4-10/ (referencing John Daniszewski’s reporting from
Baghdad: “There’s not any fighting going on” but “[t]here has been . . . wide-
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to the war, the National Museum possessed between 150,000
and 200,000 items,61 but on April 12, looters broke into the museum without being obstructed by U.S. forces62 and stole or de63
On April 13, Robert Fisk,
stroyed over ten thousand relics.
an embedded reporter from the Independent on Sunday, recounted his perceptions at the scene and stated: “Our feet
crunched on the wreckage of 5,000-year old marble plinths and
stone statuary and pots that had endured every siege of Baghdad, every invasion throughout history, only to be destroyed
64
when Americans came to ‘liberate’ this city.”
While several thousand antiquities were recovered,65 other
66
pieces were sold on the international black market at high

spread looting” because “there’s no police authority”); Day 21 of the War, THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
9,
2003),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/09/iraq2 (reporting that combat
in Baghdad was limited but that “Widespread looting breaks out unhindered
in Baghdad as government control appears to be on the brink of collapse”). In
addition to the chronology of looting in Baghdad, similar behavior occurred in
Basra, where the library, university, and other public edifices were trashed.
See REBECCA KNUTH, BURNING BOOKS AND LEVELING LIBRARIES 195 (2006).
61 Andrew Lawler, Ten Millennia of Culture Pilfered Amid Baghdad
Chaos, 300 SCIENCE 402, Apr. 18, 2003, at 402.
62 Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 236-37; Could U.S. Have Prevented Iraqi
Looting?,
ABC
NEWS
(Apr.
17,
2003),
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=129734 (stating that three members of
the White House Cultural Property Advisory Committee officials resigned
over the looting because they were “[a]ngered that eh U.S. military didn’t
work to prevent the looting”).
63 Donny George, Foreword, THE LOOTING OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM,
BAGHDAD: THE LOST LEGACY OF ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA 1-2 (Milbry Polk &
Angela M.H. Schuster eds., 2005)(museum curator estimating that 15,000
objects were stolen from the museum); Willis, supra note 1, at 227-28 (reporting numbers suggesting that fifteen to seventy thousand pieces were looted or
destroyed).
64 DILIP HIRO, SECRETS AND LIES 288 (2004).
65 Roger Atwood, Stop Thieves! Recovering Iraq’s Looted Treasures,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2004, at B2 (noting that 5,200 pieces were recovered out
of 13,000 stolen); Bogdanos, supra note 4, at A21 (reporting that 6,000 pieces
were recovered).
66 See generally Matthew Bogdanos, Thieves of Baghdad (2005); Dan
Cruickshank & David Vincent, Under Fire: People, Places and Treasures in
Afghanistan, Iraq and Israel 126-27 (2003); Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling
the International Market in Antiquities: Reducing the Harm, Preserving the
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prices due to rarity.67 The Coalition Provisional Authority estimated the losses from looting at $12 billion.68 Despite Iraqi
and international laws affirming that ownership of archaeological items remain the property of the government and the peo69
ple in the state of origin, the newfound awareness of how
much relics could fetch on the international black market left
an estimated 12,000 unguarded archaeological sites vulnerable
to illegal diggers who might discover items and sell them with70
out serial numbers or authoritative markings.
In contrast, the U.S. Department of Defense exhibited a
disparate level of caretaking when authorities seized and kept
irreplaceable original documents of the Iraqi government as
part of an “Iraq Perspectives Project” of the former regime and
published reports, such as A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom
71
from Saddam’s Senior Leadership and Saddam and Terror72
ism, and requested U.S. universities to submit research pro-

Past, 8 Chi. J. Int’l L. 169, 180-81 (2007); Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 187,
202; Sumedha Senanayake, Iraq: Antiquities Continue to be Pillaged, Destroyed,
Radio
Free
Europe
(Oct.
12,
2006),
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071983.html.
67
Karin E. Borke, Searching for a Solution: An Analysis of the Legislative
Response to the Iraqi Antiquities Crisis of 2003, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART &
ENT. L. & POL’Y 381, 387-88 (2003).
68 DOBBINS, JONES, RUNKLE & MOHANDAS, supra note 2, at 111.
69 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A.
Res. 61/295, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (affirming that
“[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to . . . maintain, protect, and have access
to privacy to their religious and cultural sites. . .”); Patty Gerstenblith,
Change in the Legal Regime Protecting Cultural Heritage in the Aftermath of
the War in Iraq, in THE DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN IRAQ 183-89
(Peter G Stone & Joanne Farchakh Bajjaly ed., 2008) (noting Iraq’s laws declare that all discovered antiquities become property of the state).
70 Alexandra Zavis, Ancient Civilization . . . Broken to Pieces, L.A. TIMES,
Jan
22,
2008,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgantiquities22jan22,1,4177435.story?page=1; Willis, supra note 1, at 228 (noting that thousands of other Iraqi archaeological sites throughout the country
remained vulnerable to damage and looting).
71 KEVIN M. WOODS, ET. AL., IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT: A VIEW OF
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM FROM SADDAM’S SENIOR LEADERSHIP (2006), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/iraqreport.pdf.
72 KEVIN M. WOODS & JAMES LACEY, IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT: SADDAM
AND TERRORISM: EMERGING INSIGHTS FROM CAPTURED IRAQI DOCUMENTS, Vol. 1
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posals.73 The 1954 Hague Convention prohibits the taking of
“archives,” which includes “records” that delineate the activities and procedures of government and non-agencies,74 but international law can permit seizing state papers as an interpretation of military necessity when taken in connection to a
75
war. In this instance, the war was over, no ongoing “military

(Nov.
2007),
available
at
https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/JA
WD/ida-paper-p-4287-Vol-1.pdf.
73 DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. ARMY RESEARCH OFFICE, BROAD AGENCY
ANNOUNCEMENT NO. W911NF-08-R-0007, IRAQI PERSPECTIVES PROJECT 19
(2008) (“[i]n the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a vast number of documents and other media came into the possession of the Department of Defense.”); Hugh Eakin, Iraqi Files in U.S.: Plunder or Rescue?, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008, at El (reporting the Hoover Institution held them for preservation
until they could be returned to Iraq; the five million documents were being
stored at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University); Letter from Richard
Sousa, Senior Assoc. Dir. Hoover Inst., to Mark A. Green, President, Soc’y of
Am.
Archivists
(June
6,
2008),
available
at
http://www.archivists.org/statements/Iraqi%20Records_HooverLetter.pdf
(emphasizing that the Iraqi government granted permission to hold the documents and that keeping them at the Hoover Institution was safer than holding them in Iraq).
74 Douglas Cox, Archives and Records in Armed Conflict: International
Law and the Current Debate Over Iraqi Records and Archives, 59 CATH. U.L.
REV. 1001, 1004-06, 1008 (2010) (calling the archives “an essential part of the
heritage of any national community”).
75 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), art. 52, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (“military objectives are limited
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage”); Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23(g), 36 Stat. 2277. (“it is especially forbidden to destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or
seizure [is] imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.”); Soc’y of Am.
Archivists & Ass’n of Canadian Archivists, SAA/ACA Joint Statement on Iraqi
Records
(Apr.
22,
2008),
https://www.archivists.org/statements/IraqiRecords.asp (emphasizing that
“the 1907 Hague IV Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land . . . narrowly restricts the purposes for which a combatant can seize enemy records and forbids confiscation of private property, and . . . the 1954
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of
Armed Conflict . . . states: ‘Each High Contracting Party undertakes to re-
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necessity” existed, and the Society of American Archivists expressed concern about the return of the documents.76
B. Explanations for the Cause of Looting
The first causal event that led to the looting was the Bush
Administration’s decision to attack Iraq without United Nations Security Council assent. From the vista of an undertaking that initiates a chain of events, a primary cause of the antiquity losses can be assessed with bald logic: “If Country A had
not invaded or destabilized Country B, then no threat to Coun77
While Bush
try B’s cultural property would have emerged.”
Administration officials alleged that the United Nations was
ineffective in disarming Iraq of prohibited weapons, those
weapons ultimately did not exist.78 If a war is illegal, the violator can owe compensatory damages flowing from the armed
combat.79 UN Charter rules prohibit wars without Security

turn, at the close of hostilities, to the competent authorities of the territory
previously occupied, cultural property [including “manuscripts . . and important collections of books or archives”] which is in its territory, if such
property has been exported in contravention of the principle laid down in the
first paragraph.’”).
76 See Soc’y of Am. Archivists & Ass’n of Canadian Archivists, supra note
75 (stating that the U.S. military seized millions of pages of state documents
and that the records should be returned to Iraq).
77 Matthew D. Thurlow, Protecting Cultural Property in Iraq: How American Military Policy Comports with International Law, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEV. L.J. 153, 162 (2005); Barbara Lee, Essays From the Role of Law & Policy: Africa, the Caribbean, and the United States: Preempting Democracy: The
Bush Administration vs. the World, 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 29, 33 (2005)
(stating that with the Bush Administration’s decision to topple the Iraqi government, it “unleash[ed] waves of looting and destruction for which it apparently failed to plan”).
78 Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information and Judicial Evidentiary
Standards, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 811, 875-82 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky,
Intelligence Information]; see generally Robert Bejesky, Weapon Inspections
Lessons Learned: Evidentiary Presumptions and Burdens of Proof, 38
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 295 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Weapon Inspections].
79 Rep. of the Int’d Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug.
10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) (stating
that “every internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international
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Council assent or an acceptable justification.80 Even if a war is
legal, the attacking state is obliged to not actively despoil cultural property unless there is a compelling military necessity,
such as if a military is engaged in combat operations with enemy forces and combat gravitates into a vicinity in which cultural property can become collateral damage. Forces need not
guard, protect, or prevent the destruction of cultural property if
doing so requires troops to assume the risk of suffering lethal
force.
Invading forces did not destroy cultural property at the
Iraq National Museum and valuables were not deemed collateral damage, but invading forces might have been obligated to
devise reasonable efforts to obstruct others from looting or
81
This possibility invokes quesdamaging cultural property.
tions over the “but for” cause of loss, based on the gamut of legal obligations at the time. The more effective control U.S. military forces held over Baghdad, the greater the obligation that

responsibility of that state.”); 3 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS LIBRI
TRES 192-94 (W. Wherwell trans., Cambridge ed. 1853) (1646) (“If the reason
for the war is unjust, all activities resulting from this war are unjust because
of their intrinsic injustice . . . The obligation of restitution lies with the persons who perpetrated the war, either by starting it, being rulers themselves,
or by giving advice to rulers. This obligation extends to all wrongdoings that
result from war.”); Bartram S. Brown, Intervention, Self-Determination, Democracy and the Residual Responsibilities of the Occupying Power in Iraq, 11
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 23, 59 (2004) (noting that if an invasion is illegal, liability of intervening powers can extend to the indirect harms caused as
a result); Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693, 714
(2004) (stating that a state acting in violation of jus ad bellum “cannot satisfy
the proportionality requirement, and satisfaction of this requirement is a
necessary condition of permissible conduct in war.”). Following the Gulf War,
the Security Council established a tribunal with tort law personal injury categories based on the gravity of injury and individuals and entities filed 2.68
million claims seeking more than $350 billion in compensation against Iraq.
John J. Chung, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Balance of Rights Between Individual Claimants and the Government of Iraq, 10
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 141, 147-50 (2005); Kevin H. Anderson, International Law and State Succession: A Solution to the Iraqi Debt Crisis?,
2005 UTAH L. REV. 401, 433 (2005).
80 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. (4).
81
Birov, supra note 34, at 223 (noting that guarding objects during a war
is a point of contention).
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existed to protect locals and their property.82 Alternatively, if
international law required U.S. military forces to confront lethal security threats, the military may not have held effective
control over Baghdad, and security-related imperatives could
83
still take priority over thwarting the ruin of cultural property.
This was the position of General Richard Myers, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who affirmed that the military combat
84
At
operations took precedence over guarding the museum.
the time of the looting, an estimated forty thousand U.S. soldiers occupied Baghdad, but according to the U.S. Central
Command in the Arabian Gulf, the U.S. “didn’t yet have
enough troops in Baghdad to ‘secure key tactical objectives’—
traffic circles, bridges, power plants, banks, and munitions
85
Likewise, just three days
dumps—and also patrol streets.”
after the looting, Brigadier General Vincent Brooks announced
that “forces entering Baghdad were involved in ‘very intense
combat,’” and the museum suffered as a result.86 Warfare ex-

82 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 30, art.
5 (an occupier “shall as far as possible support the competent national authorities . . . in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property.”); see Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 263-64.
83 Craig J.S. Forest, The Doctrine of Military Necessity And the Protection
of Cultural Property During Armed Conflicts, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 177, 178
(2007).
84 LAWRENCE ROTHFIELD, ANTIQUITIES UNDER SIEGE: CULTURAL HERITAGE
PROTECTION AFTER THE IRAQ WAR 20 (2008); Douglas Jehl and Elizabeth
Becker, A NATION AT WAR: THE LOOTING; Experts’ Pleas to Pentagon
Didn’t Save Museum, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at B5 (reporting that Professor McGuire Gibson expressed that he thought there was an understanding
that the military would safeguard the museum and that it would not stand by
and watch it be looted, and a senior Pentagon official retorted that the “military had never promised the buildings would be safeguarded”).
85 L. PAUL BREMER III, MY YEAR IN IRAQ: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A
FUTURE OF HOPE 14 (2006); John F. Burns, Pillagers Strip Iraqi Museum of
Its Treasure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2003, at A1 (noting that there were not
enough available soldiers because there were battles across Baghdad). From
the bombing stage and up through the first few weeks of the war, locals ransacked buildings and up to 158 buildings were destroyed. HIRO, supra note
64, at 274.
86 Elise Labott and Jim Clancy, U.S.: We Didn’t Anticipate Looting, CNN
(Apr. 15, 2003), http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/
meast/04/15/sprj.irq.museum.looting/.
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isted because throughout the entire country and during the
first six weeks following the invasion, 139 U.S. troops and between 7,600 and 10,800 Iraqis were killed.87
U.S. military officials maintained that obstructing looting
should not reasonably be recognized as an obligation inherent
88
to military planning, and that the duty to secure as a police
force was an Iraqi responsibility.89 However, acting as a police
force could be compulsory as soon as an invading force establishes effective authority and control over the territory, which
90
is an event that signifies a legal occupation and imposes obligations ancillary to that occupation. U.S. Army Field Manual
27-10 calls the start of military occupation “a question of fact”

87 See The Toll of War in Iraq: U.S. Casualties and Civilian Deaths,
NPR, http://www.npr.org/news/specials/tollofwar/tollofwarmain.html (last
updated Aug. 4, 2009) (placing U.S. troop fatalities in March 2003 at 65 and
in April 2003 at 74); SPENCER C. TUCKER, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MIDDLE EAST
WARS: THE UNITED STATES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ
CONFLICTS 266 (2010) (referencing several sources of credible Iraqi death toll
figures for the first phase of operations, which was from Mar. 19, 2003 to Apr.
30, 2003).
88 Jehl & Becker, supra note 84, at B5 (Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
remarking “To try to pass off the fact of that unfortunate activity [of looting]
to a deficit in the war plan strikes me as a stretch.”).
89 Edmund L. Andrews, Iraqi Officials Say Looting of Ancient Sites Continues Despite Pleas to U.S. Troops for Help, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at
A14 (Lt. Col. Daniel O’Donoahue remarked “We don’t have anywhere enough
marines to police every fixed site in the country . . . Our view is that if it’s a
fixed site, it’s primarily an Iraqi responsibility.”). Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks
stated “At no time do we really see becoming a police force.” US Shows Off
New
Card
Trick,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
11,
200),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/11/iraq3.
90 Convention IV, supra note 25, art. 42 (“[T]erritory is considered occupied when it is . . . placed under the authority of the hostile army.”);
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 27, ¶ 351 (reiterating art. 42 of the
1907 Convention and stating that legal occupation exists in regions where
“authority has been established and can be exercised.”); Naomi Burke, A
Change in Perspective: Looking at Occupation Through the Lens of the Law of
Treaties, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 103, 125-28 (2008)(noting the extension
of treaty occupations to “occupied” territories); Noam Lubell, Challenges in
Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV RED CROSS 737,
740 (2005) (emphasizing that international conventions have defined “occupation” in terms of whether there is an effective authority and control over a
territory).
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and affirms that “no proclamation of military occupation is
necessary.”91
It does not appear that massive looting occurred before
U.S. officials claimed Baghdad was secure, but rather ensued
after a heavily armed foreign military force effectively disbanded the domestic military and police security that presumably
would have otherwise prevented the lawlessness. This demobilization became an official and legal result one month later
when all government employees associated with the former regime were banned from government service pursuant to Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1.92 However, pandemonium began at the time of the looting, according to Professor
Asli Ǘ. Bali, because “it became apparent to the Iraqi people
that law and order had dissolved and that no one exercised effective control, [which led to the] the emergence of self-help and
93
self-defense systems.” Others believed that a duty to protect

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 27, ¶¶ 355, 357.
Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 1, De-Ba’athification of Iraqi
Society,
CPA/ORD/1,
May
16,
2003,
available
at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_DeBa_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf. Order 1 removed 15,000 to 30,000
members from government positions. Purge of Saddam Loyalists, BBC, May
16, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3033919.stm; Adam Roberts,
Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human
Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L., 580, 614 (2006)(calling Order 1 much criticized).
Bremer’s CPA Order 1 ultimately pushed 140,000 Iraqis out of their jobs, but
it was reversed years later. Amit R. Paley & Joshua Partlow, Iraq’s New Law
on Ex-Baathists Could Bring Another Purge, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/22/AR2008012203538_pf.html.
93 Asli Ǘ. Bậli, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of
Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 431, 452 (2005); Kristin E. Petersen, Cultural Apocalypse Now: The Loss of the Iraq Museum and a New
Proposal for the Wartime Protection of Museums, 16 MINN. J. INT’L L. 163,
183 (2007). As for providing security after police and military were disbanded, armed gangs roamed the streets searching for bounty. HIRO, supra note
64, at 314. By some accounts, lawlessness was more serious a year into the
occupation. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN WAR CRIMES IN IRAQ AND
BEYOND 62 (Jeremy Brecher, Jill Cutler, Brendan Smith, eds., 2005); Richard
Norton-Taylor, Violence Blamed on US Decision to Disband Iraq Army,
GUARDIAN,
Apr.
7,
2004,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/07/iraq.usa2 (noting that further
91
92
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the museum existed because the military unquestionably held
control over Baghdad on April 9, 2003, with most of the looting
occurring over the next two days.94 Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld might agree with this assessment because locals
were effectively free of the previous regime. On April 12, 2003,
after the looting and vandalism appeared in global new
sources, Rumsfeld explained “Freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad
95
things . . . Stuff happens.”
There was also an assortment of news reports contending
that U.S. troops were available in varying capacities. Many
96
Iraqis denounced U.S. troops for not securing the museum
violence broke “when the US decided to disband the Iraqi army” and that this
decision was in opposition to the British proposal to negotiate with the military and allow them to maintain law and order); Food and Agriculture Organization, Crop, Food Supply, and Nutrition Assessment Mission to Iraq
(Sept. 23, 2003), http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/j0465e/j0465e00.HTM#33
(noting the high level of food insecurity). If occupying forces cannot be counted on for protection, locals will likely continue to take advantage of the situation. JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE
RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 147, 15758 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006).
94 Amy E. Miller, The Looting of Iraqi Art: Occupiers and Collectors Turn
away Leisurely from the Disaster, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 49, 70 (2005)
(noting that there was definitely military control and also stating that the
“bulk of the looting and destruction of the National Museum and Library of
Iraq occurred on Thursday, April 10, 2003, and Friday, April 11, 2003.”); See
Contra Dick Jackson, Cultural Property Protection in Stability operations,
2008 ARMY L. 47, 51 (2008) (Colonel writing that “there is still considerable
controversy to this day about when U.S. forces established effective control
over the area of Baghdad near the museum which would trigger the protection of an occupying force”).
95 Sean Loughlin, Rumsfeld on Looting in Iraq: ‘Stuff Happens,’ CNN,
Apr. 12, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/04/11/sprj.irq.pentagon/; See also
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Beyond Wealth: Stories of Art, War, and Greed, 59
ALA. L. REV. 1075, 1100 (2008); Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 195-96.
96 Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 190; Sasha P. Paroff, Another Victim of
the War in Iraq: The Looting of the National Museum in Baghdad and the Inadequacies of International Protection of Cultural Property, 53 EMORY L.J.
2021, 2046 (2004) (stating that the museum’s deputy director explained that
“the Americans were supposed to protect the museum. If they had just one
tank and two soldiers nothing like this would have happened.”); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, Coalition Forces Must Stop Iraqi Looting, Apr. 12, 2003
available at http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2003/04/11/coalition-forces-must-
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especially after locals requested troops to prevent future looting.97 The U.S. military could have issued an order to guard
the museum. By some accounts, the U.S. actually did issue that
98
directive, but what precisely was directed is not conspicu99
ous. One account reported that a tank and five marines were
present at the National Museum on Thursday, April 10, and af100
ter U.S. forces fired a few shots, potential vandals departed,
101
but looters later returned and broke into the museum.
An-

stop-iraqi-looting (“International law requires that occupying powers must
ensure the safety of the civilian population in areas under their control.”);
UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL ON THE SAFETY AND
SECURITY OF UN PERSONNEL IN IRAQ 5-6 (Oct. 20, 2003),
http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/safety-security-un-personnel-iraq.pdf (noting
that well after there was an obligation to provide security, the U.N. headquarters was bombed in Iraq and the US military did not provide security to
the headquarters either even though they were obligation to do so).
97 See Burns, supra note 85, at A1 (reporting that Iraqi Archaeologist
Raid Abdul Ridhar Muhammad “asked them [U.S. military troops] to bring
their tank inside the museum grounds . . . [b]ut they refused and left.”); See
also Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 236-37; See Fiachra Gibbons, Experts
Mourn the Lion of Nimrud, Looted as Troops Stood By, THE GUARDIAN,
Apr. 30, 2003, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/
apr/30/internationaleducationnews.arts (explaining that Dr Donny George, a
curator at the Baghdad museum, expressed: “One of our staff who lived in the
museum compound went to an American tank and pleaded with them, begged
in fact, for them to come in front of the museum to keep it safe . . . But he was
told they had no orders to do so.”); Naomi Klein, Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia, HARPERS, Sept. 2004 (noting that Sabah Asaad, managing director of a refrigerator factory near Baghdad, remarked that he went to Army soldiers for help to remove looters and the
officer remarked: “Sorry, we can’t do anything, we need an order from President Bush.”).
98 ROTHFIELD, supra note 84, at 20 (reporting that Secretary of State
Powell stated that CENTCOM did instruct troops to protect museums);
Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 236-37 (stating that the U.S. military was told to
protect the looted museum). In July 2003, Pentagon Attorney Major Enge
explained: “Once it becomes evident that cultural sites or museums are being
targeted by looters, a Ground Forces Component Commander may issue order to protect these sites.” Thurlow, supra note 77, at 174.
99 Burns, supra note 85, at A1 (reporting that Mohsen Hassan, the deputy curator, had received mixed signals from the US military command about
the degree of protection that would be provided).
100 Id.; see also Thurlow, supra note 77, at 176-77.
101 Thurlow, supra note 77, at 177.
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other report stated that a U.S. tank accidentally blew a hole in
a portion of the museum and marauders emerged.102 There
were also contradictory reports of whether U.S. military personnel encouraged vandalism or engaged in misconduct related
103
to the looting.
Irrespective of questions over the immediate cause of the
destruction and whether it would have been sensible to initiate
efforts to protect the museum, perhaps what is most distressing is the fact that for five thousand years and with numerous
governing factions, these artifacts remained intact; Iraqis did
not have such disrespect for their own country or history.
Keeping these artifacts for thousands of years suggests that
the Iraqi people (and even Hussein’s regime) provided exem104
plary protection for their cultural heritage. But, concomitant

102 Iraq’s Insurgency, Funded by Treasure, ABC NEWS, Apr. 11, 2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/IraqCoverage/story?id=1832620&page=1.
103 Col. Dick Jackson explained that “[t]here are no allegations that U.S.
Armed Forces participated in looting,” and “General Order Number 1 specifically prohibits such conduct.” Jackson, supra note 94, at 51. Some media reports contended that US military troops encouraged and actively vandalized
and destroyed artifacts and ancient ruins. Ed Vulliamy, Troops ‘Vandalize’
Ancient
City
of
Ur,
THE
GUARDIAN,
May
18,
2003,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/18/internationaleducationnews.
iraq. An Iraqi doctor explained: “I saw American soldiers standing by, taking
photographs, cheering them on.” Patrick Cockburn, The Path to Peace: Allies
Face a Tough Battle to Bring Normality, THE INDEPENDENT, June 25, 2003,
available
at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168general/36815.html?tmpl=component. As the looting erupted, isolated mainstream media reports began documenting that the looting and chaos was being encouraged by the US military, as vandals gutted “every important public
institution in the city,” including schools, libraries, hospitals, museums and
electric plants. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 93, at 60-61; See also
HIRO, supra note 64, at 258; Daniel Bodanky, Establishing the Rule of Law,
33 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 119, 121 (2004). Whether they were taken at the
time of the looting or acquired at some time during the occupation, U.S. military personnel smuggled artifacts into the U.S. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, ICE Returns Saddam Hussein Ceremonial Sword to Republic of Iraq,
July
29,
2013,
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1307/130729washingtondc2.htm (noting a
sword that was sold by the Amoskeag Auction Company in Manchester, N.H.,
on January 7, 2012 for $15,000).
104
Marion Forsyth, Casualties of War: The Destruction of Iraq’s Cultural
Heritage as a Result of U.S. Action During and After the 1991 Gulf War, 14
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with military announcements of Baghdad being secure, public
facilities, including the National Museum, began to be destroyed. Even if there were no bombings of the enumerated
historical, cultural, or archaeological sites that would violate
105
the military occupation’s indifference to
international law,
the looting of the museum in Baghdad precipitated a similar
outcome to historical wars in which invading forces destroyed
106
The Bush Administration received criticultural heritage.
cism throughout the world for failing to secure the museum,107
with Professor O’Connell writing that “U.S. negligence in Iraq
has truly resulted in a crisis surrounding Iraqi cultural property. Only a few of the high-value, high-quality pieces looted
108
from Iraq had been recovered five years after the invasion.”
C. Warnings Made Looting More Foreseeable
A routine examination of the duty of care in tort law frequently considers the foreseeability of acts that can cause
harm. In the case of a possible duty to protect during an effective occupation, this inquiry might probe the reasonable expec-

DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 73, 75-77 (2004); Miller, supra note 94, at 64
(Hussein placed restrict regulations on protecting Iraq’s artifacts).
105 Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 305-06.
106 KNUTH, supra note 60, at 201-20.
107 Gerstenblith, supra note 36, at 692 (noting that the U.S. “failure to
protect and to plan to protect these cultural institutions was widely condemned.”); Hamada Zahawi, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake
of Operation Iraqi “Freedom,” 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2295, 2297-98 (2007) (stating
that many experts placed responsibility for failing to prevent looting and impeding humanitarian assistance directly on Coalition Forces); See also Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 189-93; Thurlow, supra note 77, at 177-78; Joshua M.
Zelig, Recovering Iraq’s Cultural Property: What Can Be Done to Prevent Illicit Trafficking, 31 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 289, 311 (2005) (reporting that The
China Daily opined: “It is immoral for the United States to destroy Iraq’s culture while trying to rebuild the country economically and politically. The selfproclaimed liberators’ cannot escape worldwide criticism at a time when
UNESCO is launching a strong campaign across the world to protect endangered cultural heritages.”); Cohan, supra note 9, at 63 (“The entire international community has a common interest in protecting cultural property.”);
Jehl & Becker, supra note 84, at B5.
108 O’Connell, supra note 95, at 1101.
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tations of those directing war efforts by raising the foreseeability of Iraqi actions under the circumstances. The looting of relics may be a foreseeable event following an invasion of another
country because destruction of edifices and infrastructure can
make valuable items easier to pilfer. Moreover, displacement
of the former regime (that imposed law and order) might reduce the thief’s perceived risk of anticipated penalty for engaging in criminal activity. Common knowledge of the elevated
109
importance of Iraq’s ancient history, the expectation of loot110
recent regional exing based on the value of the treasures,
111
amples of pilferage during warfare, and vulnerable anteceding conditions112 also generated specific, foreseeable warnings.
In January 2003, Nancy C. Wilkie, president of the Archaeological Institute of America (AIA), punctuated the menace
that war can inflict on cultural institutions, such as the Iraq
National Museum, and explained that “AIA members and colleagues are already petitioning the U.S. government to exercise
caution and providing adequate information about the location

Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 273-75.
See Priscilla Singer, Note, The New American Approach to Cultural
Heritage Protection: Granting Foreign Aid for Iraqi Cultural Heritage, 11
CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. 1, at 16 (2011) (The National Museum staff recognized threats and took measures to safeguard the museum, including by
having teams available to defend the museum and by moving thousands of
items that could easily be stolen into storage areas). Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 30, art. 4. (These were arguably reasonable measures to adhere to obligations under the Hague Convention “to
prepare in time of peace for the safeguarding of cultural property situated
within their own territory against the foreseeable effects of an armed conflict.”)
111 Recent regional examples that should have heightened the expectation of pilferage during warfare include thefts at the Kabul Museum during
the Soviet-U.S. proxy war in Afghanistan during the 1980s, looting and destruction during the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s, and pillaging surrounding the Gulf War in 1991. See Cohan, supra note 9, at 40-41; see also Jehl &
Becker, supra note 84, at B5.
112 U.S. officials might have cognized that it was more difficult for Iraqi
authorities to safeguard cultural heritage, because of the destruction caused
during the 1991 Gulf War and the post-war sanction regime shorn funding
for archaeological operations and preservation programs. see Forsyth, supra
note 104, at 78-80.
109
110
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of ancient sites to help protect them should a conflict occur.”113
Archaeologists provided the U.S. government with coordinates
of crucial locations that needed to be secured due to the prospect of looting, and the Iraq National Museum was at the top
114
A Pentagon memo, dated March 26, 2003, one
of the list.
week into the invasion and two weeks prior to the looting, recognized that a plan was required to “prevent further damage,
destruction, and/or pilferage [of Baghdad’s museum, which is] .
115
. . one of the largest archaeological museums in the world.”
Concerned experts also imparted immediate notifications.
On April 9, three days prior to the start of the looting, the
AIA provided warning letters to the White House, the Department of Defense, and Department of State, urging “upon the
Coalition forces to provide immediate security, where necessary, for museums and major archaeological sites; to make public statements condemning the looting of sites and museums
and warning that cultural objects removed from Iraq are stolen
property; and, where necessary, to make appropriate shows of

113 Nancy C. Wilkie, From the President: In the Shadow of War, 56
ARCHAEOLOGY ARCHIVE 1, 2003.
114 See Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 286-287 (The U.S. Department of
State received warnings of the damage that could be inflicted on the Iraq National Museum and was apprised that it was the paramount archaeological
site in the country.); Alfred Lubrano, U.S., Scholars Spar on Looting of Artifacts, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 17, 2003, at A01 (An archaeologist at the University of Pennsylvania explained that if it were possible to “simultaneously explode the National Gallery, the Library of Congress, the cultural institutions
of Philadelphia, Boston, and New York, then add the Louvre and the British
Museum, that might describe the magnitude of loss to world culture and ancient
scholarship
that
the
looting
wrought.”),
available
at
http://articles.philly.com/2003-04-17/news/25476784_1_baghdad-museumlooting-pentagon;. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, supra note 75, art. 27 (The 1907 Hague Regulations mandate that the
defending state designate the cultural location with “distinctive and visible
signs.”); In this case, it would seem less necessary to mark the location and
more unreasonable to remove cultural treasures from their routine location
because the situs was known around the world. Andrew Lawler, Saving
Iraq’s
Treasures,
SMITHSONIAN
MAG.,
(June
2003),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/saving-iraqs-treasures83214090/?no-ist (noting that for over eighty years these items were held in
the National Museum in Baghdad).
115 Willis, supra note 1, at 225.
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force to stop looting.”116 However, when members of the press
queried Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld over whether scholars
notified of potential peril to the museum, his reply was, “not to
117
Alternatively, General Meyers did have a
my knowledge.”
recollection and remarked: “We did get advice on archaeological
sites around Baghdad and in fact I think it was the Archaeological—American Archaeological Association—I believe that’s the
118
While the
correct title—wrote the Secretary some concerns.”
rest of the world reacted to the loss of the archeological treasures amid pictures of the rubble, a bewildered Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld postulated: “My goodness, were there that
many vases? Is it possible that there were that many vases in

116 Letter from Jane Waldbaum, President, Archaeological Institute of
America, to Officials in the Department of State, the Department of Defense,
the White House, and the military, (Apr. 9, 2003), (on file at
http://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/home/Letter04-09.pdf); see Jehl & Becker,
supra note 84, at B5 (reporting that “[r]epresentatives of the American Council for Cultural Policy . . . met with Defense and State Department officials in
the months before the war” and that e-mail messages were also sent in the
days prior to the attack).
117 Sandholtz, supra note 38, at 196-97.
118 Id. at 197-98 (“Ashton Hawkins, president of the non-profit American
Council for Cultural Policy, wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell,
and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and officials in other agencies . . . [and] asked what measures the U.S. invading forces would take to
protect Iraq’s antiquities from damage or destruction. He received no response.” Hawkins and Maxwell L. Anderson, president of the American Association of Museum Directors, also informed of the issue in a Washington Post
article on November 29, 2002. Hawkins and others met with Pentagon officials on January 29, 2003 and informed of important locations to protect and
the Pentagon’s own Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
apparently identified the Iraqi National Museum and the national bank as
the top two targets for looters); see also Open Declaration on Cultural Heritage at Risk in Iraq, AIA NEWS, Mar. 19, 2003, available at
http://www.archaeological.org/news/advocacy/134 (stating the U.N. and international authorities warning that cultural heritage was in danger “The
extraordinary global significance of the monuments, museums, and archaeological sites of Iraq (ancient Mesopotamia) imposes an obligation on all peoples and governments to protect them. In any military conflict that heritage
is put at risk, and it appears now to be in grave danger.”); Terry Frieden, Iraqi Antiquity Seized at U.S. Airport, CNN (Apr. 20, 2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/04/23/sprj.nilaw.antiquities/index.html?iref=
mpstoryview; Interpol Hunts Stolen Iraqi Art, CNN (Apr. 18, 2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/04/18/sprj.nilaw.artifacts.interpol/.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss2/1

28

ROBERTBEJESKY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

A THEORIZATION ON EQUITY

7/14/2015 4:38 PM

425

the whole country?”119
In terms of tort law causation, one can argue that Iraqi
looters were the direct intervening cause of the damage to the
120
Therefore, if U.S. authorities unreasonably nemuseum.
glected to heed warnings and failed to secure the museum,
perhaps these inadequacies were of secondary significance.
However, it might have been logical to forecast that the average Iraqi citizen would be needy in a country with a low per
capita income and may not have had a viable means of earning
121
This would particularly be the case after cities were
money.
bombed, infrastructure became decrepit, normal daily schedules and commercial activities halted, and futures made indeterminate with an occupying military force in the country.
Perhaps Pentagon announcements that the city was secured effectively signaled that there was no competing authority capable of wielding force and no domestic government facilities to
distribute humanitarian assistance to the people. The adversity and economic catastrophe was globally observed as the media displayed American troops making goodwill deliveries of
bulk quantities of food.122 In addition, two weeks before the

O’Connell, supra note 95, at 1100 (citing comment of Apr. 12, 2003).
See Frank Rich, And Now, ‘Operation Iraqil Looting,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2003 (reporting that an U.S. official stated, “I don’t think that anyone anticipated that the riches of Iraq would be looted by the Iraqi people” and that
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer called the looting “a reaction to oppression.”);
U.S.: We Didn’t Anticipate Looting, supra note 86 (U.S. military officials explaining that they failed “to anticipate Iraq’s cultural riches would be looted
by its own people.”); Robert Fisk, A Civilization Torn to Pieces, THE
INDEPENDENT
Apr.
13,
2003,
available
at
https://www.commondreams.org/views03/0413-06.htm (“The Iraqis did it.
They did it to their own history.”).
121 Cohan, supra note 9, at 8, 10.
122 David Glazier, Introduction, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1-2
(2009) (pointing out that two days before the invasion Bush addressed the
nation and stated that a U.S. attack “will deliver the food and medicine you
need” and liberate the country to be “prosperous and free,” but instead “it has
been the Iraqi people who have largely borne the costs” of the Bush Administration’s war); Survey Shows High Prevalence of Food Insecurity in Iraq,
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (Sept. 28, 2004), http://www.wfp.org/news/newsrelease/survey-shows-high-prevalence-food-insecurity-iraq (noting that in
September 2004, the United Nations World Food Program undertook an in119
120
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looting, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1472 to summon the international community to assist in resolving the
humanitarian crisis.123 Comparatively, John Cohan points out
that “[d]uring the Great Depression in the United States, there
was widespread subsistence looting of prehistoric sites” and
124
It is unlikely that
looters were selling the items to buy food.
starving Americans perpetrated the thefts because they were
bent on desolating public property, but so acted with an ostensible motive of heedfulness for survival. Perhaps the impetus
for action was similar for Iraqis.
IV. SOVEREIGN AND OFFICIAL IMMUNITIES
A. The Scenario
With the aforementioned events surrounding the looting
and the fact that Iraq does have a right to reacquire pilfered
vestigation and found that 6.5 million Iraqis, or 25% of the population, “remain highly dependent on [government] food rations.”).
123 S.C. Res. 1472, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1472 (Mar. 28, 2003); HIRO,
supra note 64, at 192-94. (Al Jazeera and a dozen other channels “provided
straight news that in many ways gave their viewers a more rounded picture—from the inside—than the Anglo-American networks did. While the
Anglo-American networks tended to show Allied medics treating injured Iraqi
civilians tenderly while their armed colleagues handed out drinking-water
cans to thirsty Iraqi POWs, the Arab media, while airing the briefings and
sound bites coming from London, Washington, and Doha . . . also showed the .
. . charred Iraqi bodies, [corpses, blood-soaked pavements, blown-out brains,
screaming infants and wailing women] . . . grievously wounded civilians . . .
[children wounded by US cluster bombs,] dead Allied troops and injured Iraqi
soldiers, hospitals choked with wounded and burnt Iraqis. Away from the
battle zone, the Arab networks showed Iraqi suffering, humiliation, and panic
– distraught families held up at Anglo-American military checkpoints, hooded Iraqi POWs, thousands of fleeing the capital, and civilians, deprived of
food and water, driven to begging or looting.”).
124 See Cohan, supra note 9, at 8. The poverty continued in the following
weeks. See also Stan Crock, Commentary: How the U.S. Can Keep Iraq from
Unraveling, BUS. WK., June 2, 2003, at 28 (“Peace is turning out to be hell for
average Iraqis. Electricity is still out in many parts of Baghdad. Looting is
rampant, as thieves fill trucks with everything from scrap wood to crates of
weapons. The threat of carjacking and kidnapping keeps people locked inside
their houses. Drinking water is dicey. Many can’t return to work, while children can’t attend school.”).
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antiquities under international and domestic law, the Iraqi Interior Ministry’s Economic Crimes Department’s investigation
into the acts of 39 countries to facilitate the return of stolen ar125
tifacts is a prudent step. If items have not been discovered
or were desecrated, however, an alternative query is whether
damage remedies could be available against states or officials
whose malfeasance or misfeasance led to the looting and destruction. Both the compulsion of a reluctant state to procure
the return of an item and the attainment of damage remedies
would likely require an assessment of sovereign and official
immunities.
Pursuant to the comity-based act of state doctrine, the
courts in one state will not question another state’s public
126
However, exceptions have developed. In the U.S., the
acts.
1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) permitted the
revocation of sovereign immunity from federal and state court
jurisdiction when “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue.”127 In Republic of Austria et al. v.
Altmann, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether Altmann
could sue Austria in federal court under section 2 of the FSIA,
which permits federal civil “claim[s] for relief in personam with
respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immuni128
ty.”
Altmann sought to recover paintings that were expropriated from her uncle in 1938 during World War II and were

125 See Kislova, supra note 5. International treaty obligations (as considered in Part II) suggest that equitable remedies are warranted to procure the
return of identified items located in a foreign jurisdiction.
126 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (“The
act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this
country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign
sovereign power committed within its own territory”); See also Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 451 (1987) (“Under international law,
a state or state instrumentality is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts
of another state, except with respect to claims arising out of activities of the
kind that may be carried out by private persons.”).
127 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012). If sovereign immunity applies, the typical procedure involves the state-defendant making a special appearance in
U.S. courts and dismissing the case. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 126.
128 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
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presently held and displayed at the Austrian National Gallery.129 Austria purchased the paintings in 1941, but in 1948,
museum authorities falsely represented that the museum received valid title to the paintings through bequeath. Premised
on these facts, the U.S. Supreme Court decided it was the judiciary’s role to determine whether sovereign immunity should
apply to Austria in U.S. courts and whether the 1976 FSIA
130
The Supreme Court affirmed the
would apply retroactively.
lower court’s decision that pierced sovereign immunity and al131
The Supreme
lowed the case to proceed in U.S. courts.
Court’s decision led both parties to assent to arbitration in
Austria. In January 2006, the arbitration panel awarded Altmann with ownership of five paintings that were stolen in
132
1938.
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision to pierce sovereign
immunity and the arbitration panel’s decision to order Austria
to return the paintings, it could be reasonable to extrapolate

Id.
Id. at 677, 679, 682, 702; 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012) (“Claims of foreign
states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United
States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this
chapter.”); See also Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t
of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984–85 (1952) (noting also that the “restrictive
theory” of sovereign immunity started in 1952 and granted sovereign immunity to all public acts, but not private acts). With respect to the choice of a national forum, one might presume that the locus of the property and the situs
of the wrong would provide a more appropriate forum. The respondent did
initially seek, but was effectively hindered from attaining a remedy in Austrian courts. See Altmann, supra note 128, at 684-85, (noting that respondent sought to recover the paintings in Austrian courts but costs to proceed
were specially set at $350,000, but the Austrian Government appealed the
partial waiver, and respondent dismissed the suit); Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, 541 U.S. at 706 (Breyer, J., concurring) (The lower federal court did
not address “any legal determination about the merits of Austrian legal procedures” but the sole issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was retroactivity of
the FSIA’s “expropriation exception.”).
131 Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 965, 974 (9th Cir.
2002); Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1201 (C.D. Cal.
2001).
132 William Grimes, Maria Altmann, Pursuer of Family’s Stolen Paintings, Dies at 94, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at B19.
129
130
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the circumstance to a hypothetical damage remedy.133 The tribunal found that Altmann did have a legal right to the paintings because of the previous private ownership, just as, via domestic and international laws, the Iraqi public is the legal
owner of artifacts that went missing during the 2003 war and
occupation. The question is how a state, or perhaps even government officials, could be liable for potentially wrongful acts
that set the looting in motion or permitted the thefts and destruction to transpire.
The legal deduction espoused requires assessing the pertinent factual chronology leading to the 2003 invasion and immunities at the international level (section B) and the domestic
level (section C). Head of state immunity is distinguishable
from sovereign immunity, but both are often treated in conjunction because of the assumption that the top official’s state
134
acts are immune from actions brought by other states. There
is, however, a separation in the case of war crimes tribunals
and crimes against humanity because leaders can be held responsible for illicit acts regarding official immunity. This assumption is also employed in the case at hand: Section B considers how official immunity is pierced at the international
level for grave crimes against humanity and war crimes and

133 For example, if the Austrian National Gallery certifiably possessed
the paintings under the same circumstances and those paintings later went
missing, perhaps a damage claim could have been available for the market
value of the paintings. If a damage claim would have been available against
Austria, then Austria’s recourse, based on the original transaction (rather
than the cause of the later uncanny disappearance), would have been against
the thieves who stole the art during World War II, intermediaries who sold
the art to Austria, or Austrian officials who might have knowingly been involved in an illegal transaction or representation of fraud in title; all of whom
would have been unavailable or without adequate funds, which means that
without traceability of proceeds the Austrian taxpayer would assume the
loss. However, even under the facts as presented, if Austrian funds were
used to purchase the paintings and the Austrian National Gallery lost title
and possession of the paintings, this prohibits the ability to display or sell the
paintings and the Austrian taxpayer loses value.
134 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Head-of-State Immunity—Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act—Suggestion by the Department of State, 88 AM. J. INT’L L.
528, 529-30 (1994).
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extrapolates how immunity might be pierced for civil losses
that flow from these wrongs.
B. The Substantive Claim Under International Level
1. Crimes Against Humanity
After the Cold War ended, the international community
developed institutions that elevated human rights and enforced
135
The develrules that criminalized state-sponsored wrongs.
opments pierced official immunities, held a significant number
of top officials criminally responsible, and placed many other
136
leaders under threat of prosecution.
However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) also articulated principles that
upheld sovereign prerogative and official immunity at the domestic level.
In the ICJ Arrest Warrant case, Belgium, pursuant to its
incorporation of Geneva Convention offenses and crimes
against humanity into domestic law, issued an arrest warrant
in April 2000 against an incumbent minister of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) for inciting racial hatred in
speeches in the DRC in 1998.137 The ICJ ruled that a state issuing a criminal arrest warrant against a foreign minister for
official acts violates international law because it does not respect the international law doctrine of inviolability of the public minister.138 The decision articulates that this immunity
135 LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1 (1990); Gregory H. Fox, Internationalizing National Politics: Lessons for International Organizations, 13
WIDENER L. REV. 265, 267 (2007).
136 More leaders are under the shadow of prosecution than ever before.
See generally Rutei Teitel, Perspectives on Transnational Justice: Collective
Memory, Command Responsibility, and the Political Psychology of Leadership: The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 837, 837 (2005); see also Jamie O’Connell, Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their Victims?, 46
HARV. INT’L L.J. 295, 295-96 (2005).
137 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J ¶¶ 48, 54 (Feb. 14) [hereinafter
Congo v. Belgium].
138 Id. ¶¶ 48, 54 (“the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of
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from civil and criminal jurisdiction applies to top government
officials, such as the “Head of Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs,” for acts committed while in office as a principle of
139
In addition to the fact that this
customary international law.
was a contentious dispute (rather than an advisory opinion),140
Congo acknowledged that the immunity was limited to foreign
141
Indeed, if collective asunilateral assertions of jurisdiction.
sent exists among states to establish an international tribunal,
the international tribunal could pierce the official immunity of
142
the heads of state.
For example, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a

the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, and its international circulation, constituted violations of a legal obligation of the Kingdom of Belgium towards the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, in that they failed to respect the immunity
from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo enjoyed under international law”).
139 Id. ¶¶ 51, 54. The Court emphasized that the decision was rendered
on the issue of immunity from criminal process for acts perpetrated by an incumbent minister while in office. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 21. The facts in contention
did not involve civil liability for grave crimes against humanity perpetrated
outside the leader’s home sovereign jurisdiction. The ICJ also recognized
that the head of state immunity applied to restrict the civil and criminal jurisdiction of other states as a principle of customary international law. Id. ¶¶
51, 54; See also ROGER O’KEEFE, CHRISTIAN J. TAMS & ANTONIOS
TZANAKOPOULOS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON JURISDICTIONAL
IMMUNITIES 88 (2013) (distinguishing the ICJ decision in the Arrest Warrant
case and stating that “it is difficult to see how the rationale for and resultant
nature of the immunity of the relevant State officers from foreign civil proceedings could be any different.”).
140 Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶¶ 24, 27 (noting that both parties
agreed that there was a contentious case when Congo filed the request to the
ICJ and that the case was covered by their agreement to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ statute). In a contentious dispute, the decision is
effectively limited to the facts of the case.
141 Id. ¶ 48 (Congo admitting that “immunity does not mean impunity”
because even if immunity barred “prosecution before a specific court or over a
specific period [that] does not mean that the same prosecution cannot be
brought, if appropriate, before another court which is not bound by that immunity, or at another time when the immunity need no longer be taken into
account.”).
142
Id. ¶ 61 (recognizing that international criminal tribunals can assert
jurisdiction over heads of state for crimes against humanity).
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permanent international tribunal with a mission to “guarantee
lasting respect for . . . the enforcement of international justice”
by asserting jurisdiction over only “the most serious crimes of
143
Over
concern to the international community as a whole.”
the past several years, the ICC has instituted investigations
and criminal proceedings against several African leaders.144
The most recent controversy unfolded in December 2013 when
the ICC issued an arrest warrant for incumbent Sudanese
145
Al-Bashir would not leave Sudan
President Omar Al-Bashir.
146
Kenya also
so to avoid possible execution of that warrant.
issued an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir, but the warrant was
reportedly issued on behalf of the African Union. The African
Union opposed the ICC’s arrest warrant and views the ICC’s
147
Western state membership as a form of neo-colonialism.
This contention of neo-colonialism invokes a common complaint
about international tribunals, which is that state power can politicize decisions and pierce official immunity to prosecute select leaders, while leaders in strong states (that impel the prosecutions) could be immune from liability for similar
injustices.148

143

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl, art. 5, July
17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 1003 (entered into force July 1, 2002), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf
144 International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, [No date],
http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_MENUS/ICC/SITUATIONS%20AND%20CASES/
Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx.
145 Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquhar, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for
Sudan’s
Leader,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
4,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/world/africa/05court.html?ref=omarhassa
nalbashir&_r=0.
146 Sudanese President to Skip Mandela Funeral Amid ICC Arrest Fears:
Report,
SUDAN
TRIB.,
Dec.
9,
2013,
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49129; see also Sudan’s President, Wanted by International Court, Cancels Visit to U.N., N.Y. Times, Sept.
25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/26/world/africa/sudans-presidentwanted-by-international-court-cancels-visit-toun.html?ref=omarhassanalbashir.
147 Kenya to Challenge High Court Judge’s Arrest Warrant for Sudanese
President,
CNN,
Nov.
30,
2011,
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/30/world/africa/kenya-sudan-spat/.
148 Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Politi-
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There have also been “ad hoc” international tribunals that
were constituted outside the country where wrongs occurred
and were presided over by international judges who applied in149
Through these tribunals, the collective will
ternational law.
to impose criminal liability for crimes against humanity and
war crimes prevailed over official immunity.150 By Security
Council resolution, the International Criminal Tribunal (ICTY)
was established, pierced official immunity, and extended jurisdiction over all “persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the
151
The ICTY prosecuted Presiformer Yugoslavia since 1991.”
152
dent Slobodan Milosevic
and other top government lead-

cal Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105
A.J.I.L. 1, 2 (2011)(noting that even in European countries, such as Germany,
England, France, Belgium, and Spain, which all have adopted universal jurisdiction statutes, “states have acted differently regarding similar complaints”); See Also Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 539, 541-42, 550,
588 (2005) (“Choices of which atrocity to judicialize and which individuals to
prosecute are so deeply politicized that it is problematic to pretend that they
are in any way neutral or impartial,” thus resulting in the failure to apportion blame concomitant with responsibility with powerful states being absolved of responsibility); Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of
Law: What’s the Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 809, 899 (2005) (stating
that the “failure to indict officials from the strong states, while relying on an
increasingly moralistic body of law to impose punishments on a steady parade of officials from failed states or states defeated militarily by the United
States and NATO, will undermine significantly the legitimacy of the ICC”).
149 John Dermody, Note, Beyond Good Intentions: Can Hybrid Tribunals
Work After Unilateral Intervention?, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 77,
81 (2006).
150 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity
from Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 45-60 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004) (noting that this balance between immunity and imposing punishment is found
in the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the
Nuremburg Charter).
151 S.C. Res. 827, art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), as amended
by S.C. Res. 1166 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (May 13, 1998) (establishing ICTY).
152 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance
with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 711, 805 (2008); David Tolbert, The Evolving Architecture of
International Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
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ers.153 Shortly after the ICTY was established and also deriving from authority found in a Security Council resolution, official immunity was denied to Rwandan Prime Minister Jean
Kambanda in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwan154
da.
Based on the principle that the national criminal jurisdiction where war crimes and crimes against humanity were perpetrated is an optimal forum,155 domestic and international authorities established hybrid domestic tribunals to hold former
leaders responsible under international human rights law in
156
The Special Court
East Timor, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone.

goslavia: Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER
FOREIGN WORLD AFF. 7, 7 (2002).
153 Kenneth Roth, ICTY: A Tribunal’s Legal Stumble, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2013, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/09/icty-tribunal-s-legalstumble (reporting that there have been 69 convictions of people involved in
ethnic cleansing in the 1990s Balkan wars).
154 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence,
(Sept.
4,
1998)
available
at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/KAMBANDA_ICTR-9723/KAMBANDA_ICTR-97-23-S.html; Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing ICTR).
155 Karim Khan & Rodney Dixon, Archbold: International Criminal
Courts: Practice, Procedure & Evidence, vii (2d ed. 2005) (stating that “[t]he
primary responsibility for punishing crimes of international concern such as
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes belongs to national criminal jurisdictions.”); Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Complementary and Conflicting
Relationship Between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 139, 143 (2003)
(noting that hybrid court/truth commission systems were supported by the
UN).
156 International Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Are They Necessary?, in
Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Sierra Leone, East Timor,
Kosovo, and Cambodia (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds. 2004); Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities after Conflict: What Impact on
Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 251, 280, 297-98 (2007) (stating
that hybrid tribunals first emerged in the late 1990s and have since included
criminal trials in Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone). At the UN
General Assembly’s request, in 1998, the Secretary-General appointed the
Group of Experts for Cambodia to produce a brief report on atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge regime but it was not a significant fact-finding mission. Group of Experts, The Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135, at 6, U.N. Doc.
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for Sierra Leone implemented a jurisdictional mandate to
“prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the
commission of serious violations of international humanitarian
157
law and crimes committed under Sierra Leonean law.”
Likewise, with US guidance, training of judges, and evidence
gathering, Saddam Hussein was convicted under Iraqi law in
158
Other countries have adopted
its special domestic tribunal.
the less punitive method of constituting truth commissions to
address past wrongs.159 As distinguished from the Arrest Warrant case, when the home sovereign jurisdiction does control or
participate in proceedings to render justice or conducts investigations to redress for past crimes that occurred within its own
jurisdiction, concerns over intrusion on judging sovereign head
of state actions are attenuated.
2. Ambiguity within the Contentious Case Precedent
In rendering its decision on the balance between enforcing

S/1999/231, A/53/850 (Mar. 16, 1999); Stromseth, supra, at 286-89, 296 (noting that East Timor’s hybrid tribunal had only marginal success and tried
only mid- and low-level suspects).
157 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone P 1, U.N.Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, http http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html
158 Zakia Afrin, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, 14 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP.
L. 23, 26-29 (2008).
159 O-Gon Kwon, Procedural Challenges Faced by International Criminal
Tribunals and the Value of Codification in International Criminal Procedure:
Rules and Principles 1415-18 (Goran Sluiter, Hakan Friman, Suzannah Linton, Salvatore Zappala & Sergehy Vasiliev, eds. 2013) (noting that due to the
potential populace division over the acts of former leaders, domestic forums
can face significant political challenges). Domestic political division may
have been a reason for the substantial growth in the number of truth commissions. Dana Michael Hollywood, The Search for Post-Conflict Justice in
Iraq: A Comparative Study of Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Their
Applicability to Post-Saddam Iraq, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 59, 70-71 (2007) (noting that the number of truth commissions grew from six during the 1970s
and 1980s to fourteen during the 1990s); Jon M. Van Dyke, Promoting Accountability for Human Rights Abuses, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 153, 157 n.15 (2005)
(twenty-three truth commissions have conducted investigations); See generally Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and
Atrocity 14-15 (2001).
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universal jurisdiction crimes, such as war crimes and crimes
against humanity, and the customary law of official immunity,
the ICJ referenced that it did not find cases in which heads of
state and foreign ministers were subject to the criminal juris160
This issue festered in the highdiction of national courts.
profile case of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet in
1998.
In 1985, Spain adopted a provision for criminal jurisdiction
161
over universal offenses and issued an arrest warrant for Pinochet for torture, murder, and other crimes against humanity
committed against the Chilean people after the 1973 coup.162
Spain sought jurisdiction over Pinochet when he was seeking
medical treatment in Britain. The British House of Lords assessed the legitimacy of Spain’s arrest warrant and extradition
request on virtually all charges and ultimately held that Pinochet could be extradited to Spain because torture and other
crimes against humanity are universal crimes that are not like163
However, Pinochet was not extradited
ly official functions.
to Spain because of his inability to stand trial due to health
reasons; the grounds were unrelated to the validity of an arrest
warrant issued by a national court.164 Spain did convict a lower level military official and has pursued several other military
officials in its courts for crimes against humanity committed

Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant, supra note 137 at ¶¶ 58-61.
Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [Organic Law of the Judicial Power]
art. 23(4) (B.O.E. 1985, 157 (Spain).
162 R. v. Bow St. Metrop. Stipendiary Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte) (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 190-93, 205 (appealed from Divisional
Court of the Queen’s Bench). The Pinochet dictatorship murdered or caused
the disappearance of over 2,000 individuals and tortured an estimated 27,000
people. Van Dyke, supra note 159, at 157-58.
163 R. v. Bow St. Metrop. Stipendiary Magistrate (2000), 1 A.C. 147 at
190-93, 205 (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte).
164 Homecoming for General Pinochet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000,
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/04/opinion/homecoming-for-generalpinochet.html (remarking that the extradition to Chile was based on a secret
medical examination and that Home Secretary Jack Straw believed justice
would not be served when Pinochet was so “enfeebled and mentally incompetent” but that courts in Belgium, Britain, France, Spain, and Switzerland objected).
160
161
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during Argentina’s Dirty Wars in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Argentina has recently sought the extradition of Spanish officials serving under the Francisco Franco dictatorship in
165
Spain.
Two months after the ICJ handed down the Arrest Warrant decision, Germany enacted the German Code of Crimes
Against International Law to permit its courts to assert criminal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
166
Consequently, Germany investigated Secretary of
genocide.
Defense Rumsfeld and CIA Director George Tenet for the Bush
Administration’s interrogation practices that were alleged to be
torture, but the court dismissed the case because it believed the
167
Germany’s first
U.S. would be the more appropriate forum.
indictment under the German Code of Crimes Against International Law occurred in 2011 against Rwandan rebel leaders for
crimes against humanity.168 None of these proceedings were
brought against heads of state.
A home state can also waive immunity to permit another
state to exercise jurisdiction over the head of state.169 Whether
a waiver is granted is less likely to depend on the gravity of the
alleged offenses in question and more likely to hinge on the
succeeding government’s political willingness to waive jurisdiction. For example, when Spain petitioned Britain to extradite
Pinochet to Spain, the Chilean government supported Pinochet,
165 Raphael Minder, Argentine Judge Seeks to Put Franco Officials on
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/world/
europe/argentine-judge-seeks-to-put-franco-officials-on-trial.html?_r=0.
166 Act to Introduce the Code of Crimes Against International Law [ of 26
June
2002
(trans.
by
Brian
Duffett),
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/VoeStGB.pdf.
167 IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 93, at 79, 119-25, 206; Sandra
Coliver, Jennie Green, & Paul Hoffman, Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable by Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and
Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169, 206 (2005).
168 Diana Magnay, 2 Alleged Rwandan Rebel Leaders Face War Crime
Charges
in
Germany,
CNN,
May
4,
2011,
http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/05/04/germany.rwanda.war.crimes/.
169 Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 61; Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207,
209–11 (S.D. Fl. 1993); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1518–19
(S.D. Fl. 1990); In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 1988).
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did not waive immunity, fought extradition, and threatened to
summon Spain to the ICJ for a violation of international law.170
Yet this might not have been the position of the Chilean people
at the time because polls revealed that Chileans believed Pino171
chet should have been brought to justice.
3. Extraterritoriality and Wars of Aggression
In all of the cases previously addressed, government leaders perpetrated atrocities inside their home sovereign jurisdiction, but wrongs were so grave that international actors advanced a significant interest in transnational protection of
human rights. This can be distinguished from the circumstance in which leaders promulgate orders for extraterritorial
acts, such as by directing an illegal war and by issuing directives that may be war crimes in a foreign war zone, which may
have direct reverberating effects on the international community. A war of aggression has been called the “supreme” form
172
and the act of state doctrine refers to the premise
of crime

170 Chile: Life Without Pinochet, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 1999,
http://www.economist.com/node/325551 (also stating that “[s]ince Chile returned to democracy in 1990, its conservative opposition has held a veto over
change”).
171 Transnational Institute, Chile and the End of Pinochet, Nov. 17, 2005,
http://www.tni.org/es/archives/act/4095 (stating that “Chilean opinion polls
have consistently shown clear national majorities in favor of holding Pinochet
and the military accountable for the crimes of the dictatorship”); Rosalba
O’Brien, Forty Years After Coup, Pinochet Again Divides Chile, REUTERS,
Sept. 8, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/08/us-chile-pinochetidUSBRE98705J20130908 (reporting that 55% of Chileans viewed Pinochet’s
regime as “all bad” and only 9% viewed it as “all good.”). Over forty cases
were filed in Chile against Pinochet personally. Chile: Life Without Pinochet,
supra note 170. Chilean courts stripped Pinochet of immunity several times
since 2000, but health concerns prevented criminal trials for human rights
crimes prior to his death in 2006. Chile Timeline, BBC, (last updated Aug.
14, 2012), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1222905.stm.
172 ROBERTO BELLELLI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW AND
PRACTICE FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 580 (2010); William A.
Schabas, The Unfinished Work of Defining Aggression: How Many Times
Must the Cannonballs Fly, Before They are Forever Banned?, in THE
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 12326 (Dominic McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004).
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that “the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.”173
ICJ President Guillaume pointed out that there is universal jurisdiction for certain criminal acts occurring extraterrito174
and an argument can be made that
rially, such as piracy,
treaties and customary international law mandate states to affirmatively act to punish for the most serious crimes against
175
In The Princeton Principles on
humanity and war crimes.
Universal Jurisdiction, the professors wrote “[t]he principle of
universal jurisdiction is based on the notion that certain crimes
are so harmful to international interests that states are entitled—and even obliged—to bring proceedings against the per-

Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252. (Italics added).
Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶¶ 12, 16 (separate opinion of Court
President Guillaume); David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al
Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM AND MARY L. REV. 957, 967-68 (2009)
(referencing that treaties have made terrorism a crime subject to universal
jurisdiction).
175 Non-derogative rules are those offenses for which no exception is permitted. Non-derogation is inherent to the concept of “jus cogens,” which the
Vienna Convention defines as a “peremptory norm of general international
law . . . accepted and recognized by the international community of States as
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May. 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.; Amnesty International, Denounce Torture: Torture and
the
Law
(Nov.
2001),
http://www.kintera.org/site/pp.asp?c=fnKNKUOyHqE&b=1196455
(calling
the prohibition on torture a “peremptory norm” that prevails over all inconsistent customary laws); Jordan J. Paust, Civil Liability of Bush, Cheney, et
al. for Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment and Forced Disappearance, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 359, 359 (2009) (noting that the Bush
Administration’s 2001 to 2009 sanctions to use secret detention, forced disappearances, and coercive interrogations involved “serial criminality,” war
crimes, torture, and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment that “implicat[es] universal jurisdiction and a universal responsibility.”); Steven R.
Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87
GEO. L J. 707, 727 (1999) (stating that customary international law suggests
“accountability is legally required”); See contra John Dugard, Is the Truth
and Reconciliation Process Compatible with International law ? An Unanswered Question, 13 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 258, 267 (1997) (human rights treaties do not seem to per se obligate prosecution)
173
174
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petrator, regardless of the location of the crime or the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”176
With respect to prosecuting criminal acts deriving from a
war of aggression, in 1919, the Allies composed a commission to
investigate war crimes violations committed during World War
I and compiled a list of twenty thousand German perpetra177
This finding was incorporated into the 1919 Treaty of
tors.
Versailles, which directed Germany to prosecute over eight
178
hundred of the selected war criminals in domestic courts.
The Allied victory in World War II gave the US, UK,
France, and the Soviet Union the ability to impose justice over
occupied Germany and Japan. In 1945 the International Military Tribunal (IMT) was constituted to try German war criminals under a newly-created charter to punish crimes against
179
The Nupeace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
remberg Charter stripped defendants of official immunity and
the defense of acting pursuant to superior orders180 and the
IMT acquitted three defendants and convicted nineteen, with
twelve sentenced to death.181

176 Stephen Macedo, et al., The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 16 (2001).
177 M. Cherif Bassiouni, World War I: “The War to End all Wars,” and the
Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice System, 30 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 244, 281 (2002).
178 M. Cherif Bassiouni & Michael Wahid Hanna, Ceding the High
Ground: The Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute and the Trial of Saddam
Hussein, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 21, 91-92 (2006/2007) (reporting that the
local Prosecutor General only considered forty-five cases and indicted twentytwo individuals).
179 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, arts. 6, 27, Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (articulating open-ended sentencing
guidelines of “the right to impose. . . death or such other punishment as shall
be determined. . . to be just” on conviction); See also Bernard Meltzer, Remembering Nuremberg, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 20
(Belinda Cooper ed., 1999); KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE
POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 28-29 (2006).
180 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 179, arts.
7-8.
181 Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality,
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 166, 189-90 (1947)
(proceedings were conducted for 315 days).
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After the Japanese surrender during World War II, the Instrument of Surrender stated that “the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers. . .will take such steps as he deems proper
to effectuate these terms of surrender,” which included bring182
In January 1946, General
ing war criminals to justice.
Douglas MacArthur unilaterally established the tribunal by
183
and the IMT for the Far East found
special proclamation
seventy-eight defendants guilty, imposed seven death sentences, and imposed sentences that ranged from seven years to life
184
on the remaining convictees.
The offenses that were prosecuted by World War II IMTs
185
formed the bedrock of the UN Charter.
On October 23, 1946,
President Harry Truman addressed the United Nations General Assembly and recommended that the Nuremberg Princi186
and less than two
ples be codified into international law
months later the General Assembly affirmed the condemnation
of wars of aggression in Resolution 95.187 Later resolutions
recognized that wars of aggression are proscribed as customary
international law.188

182 Instrument of Surrender, at 8, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1733, 139
U.N.T.S. 387; Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, at 10,
July 26, 1945.
183 See Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589.
184 Zhang Wanhong, From Nuremberg to Tokyo: Some Reflections on the
Tokyo Trial, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1673, 1675 (2006).
185 U.N. Charter art. 2(3) (“All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered.”); Id. art. 2(4) (requiring states to
“refrain. . .from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state.”); Id., at Ch. VII (authorizing the Security
Council to assess and act on threats to international peace and security).
186 U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, The Charter and Judgment of the Nurnberg
Tribunal: History and Analysis, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5, U.N. Sales No.
1949.V.7 (1949).
187 G.A. Res. 95 (I), at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.2 (Dec. 11, 1946) (affirming the international law principles “recognized by the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal”).
188 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, at 11, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (Mar. 11Apr. 12, 1974); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986
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The legality for the use of force and actions jus in bello
and jus post bellum determine whether an invading and occupying force may owe damages for wrongs.189 Following the
Gulf War, Security Council Resolution 687 stated: “Iraq . . . is
liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation
190
The Security Council established a subsidiary
of Kuwait.”
organ to receive damage claims and the organ utilized inquisitorial investigative standards to determine “direct losses, dam191
ages, and injuries caused by Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.”

I.C.J. 14, 102-04 (June 27).
189 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 102-04 (June 27); GROTIUS, supra note 79, at 192-94 (affirming that restitution is required for illegal wars); Yael Rouen, Illegal Occupation and Its
Consequences, 41 ISR. L. REV. 201, 201, 244 (2008) (noting that an occupation
is “illegal if it involves the violation of a peremptory norm of international
law,” such as through a “violation on the use of force, or maintained in violation in the right to self-determination.”); See e.g. Lene Bomann-Larsen, License to Kill? The Question of Just v. Unjust Combatants, 3 J. MIL. ETHICS
142, 148 (2004)(“If U.S. troops had no warrant to be in Vietnam in the first
place, how can any killing and destruction in the pursuit of their unjust cause
be morally justified?”).
Legality of actions under jus post bellum might depend on whether the
initial use of military force was legal. ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING
UNDER OCCUPATION 25 (2009) (emphasizing that the “UN General Assembly
implied that occupations resulting from illegal wars, that is, wars neither of
self-defense nor ordered by the UN Security Council according to chapter VII,
were themselves illegal.”); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE
438-39 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952) (noting that with violations of the
laws of war, it is unclear that international law mandates the occupied population to be obedient to the occupier); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 6-7 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950) (expressing that if
an occupation is unlawful then it is impossible to have a legal obligation of
obeisance within the populace that is occupied); Brown, supra note 79, at 26
(stating that an occupier still “bears continuing post-war responsibility”).
190 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 8, 1991), para. 16.
191 Chung, supra note 79, at 145; Id. at 153-55, 162-63 (noting that damage claims were tendered, but Iraq had marginal ability to refute plaintiffs
that frequently lacked records and evidence to substantiate the merits of the
wrongs and harm). Moreover, Hussein’s teetering and internationallyostracized regime would seem uninterested in the state’s future financial ac-
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Individuals and entities filed 2.68 million claims seeking more
than $350 billion in compensation,192 which was eight times the
country’s entire annual gross domestic product.193 The country
was apparently not excessively devastated because Kuwait’s
GDP rose to $37.57 billion the year after Iraq was expelled in
194
1992 and to an all-time high of $51.4 billion in 1993.
The mass tort-like liability assessed against Iraq following the Gulf War serves as precedent that international law re195
quires damages to be paid for an illegal invasion and, in conjunction with IMT precedent, possibly even that personal
capacity claims could be brought.196 To parameterize the concounts or in responding to abuse accusations.
192 Chung, supra note 79, at 147-50; Anderson, supra note 79, at 433;
Chung, supra note 79, at 149-50 (explaining that the Commission placed
claims of individuals into A, B, C, and D Categories that were quite analogous to tort law—“A” Claims assessed damages of $2,500 to $8,000 to those
required to evacuate, and B, C, and D Claims involved those who “suffered
personal injury” or damage as a result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation,
which may ranged into the hundreds of thousands of dollars).
193 From 1985 to 1990, Kuwait’s annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
averaged $41.3 billion, WORLD BANK, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK DATABASE,
Apr.
2008,
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx (using “Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDP” totals to $248.036 billion over the six-year period).
194 Id. (using “Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity
(PPP) valuation of country GDP,”); CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE 58 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003)
(noting that violence in Kuwait had a comparatively small death toll relative
to other conflicts).
195 Tim Taylor & SJ Berwin, War: The Mother of All Mass Torts?, 6
SEDONA CONF. J. 161, 161, 167 (2005) (emphasizing that war might be viewed
as a mass tort and that the legality of warfare could be tested in international courts). The 1991 Gulf War Tribunal assessed liability against the state
for the government’s acts, although Hussein’s regime monopolized government revenues while in power.
196 If a war is illegal and could impose criminal liability on government
leaders, pursuant to a “beyond a reasonable doubt” or similarly highthreshold burden of evidence, it seems that civil liability, with a lower
threshold burden of “preponderance of the evidence,” could also be assessed
and would be justified against government leaders who placed illegal actions
in motion. Civil actions have been brought against heads of state for human
rights abuses in foreign courts. JOANNE FOAKES, THE POSITION OF HEADS OF
STATE AND SENIOR OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 170-72 (2014) (noting
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text of civil immunities in infra part IV(C), the next section addresses how the Bush Administration pushed for the 2003 invasion of Iraq against the will of the international community
and how it sought diplomatic assent from states based on domestically-constituted false allegations.
4. The 2003 Invasion of Iraq
Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Bush Administration avowed that secret intelligence information confirmed that
Iraq possessed prohibited weapons and programs that posed a
security threat to the US, but United Nations inspection teams
were unable to uncover those alleged weapons during several
months of inspections prior to the war and periodically updated
the Security Council of its lack of an incriminating discovery
and of generally favorable Iraqi compliance with the process.197
Most Security Council members opposed the use of force, called
an invasion without Council authorization illegal, and wanted
to grant inspectors additional time to ensure that there were no
proscribed weapon programs, but the Bush administration ordered an attack without an authorization.198

that some foreign courts have not drawn a distinction between head of state
immunity in criminal and civil proceedings, which barred cases, and others
have made a distinction between civil and criminal immunity, and emphasizing that this same division has been found in U.S. courts under the Alien
Tort Statute jurisprudence). In a diplomatic example involving the recent
crisis over Russia’s annexation of Crimea, following the populace’s ratification to become part of Russia, President Obama civilly sanctioned a list of
high-level Russian officials in their individual capacity, but not Russian President Putin. Aamer Madhani, Obama Imposes Sanctions on 7 Russians After
Crimea
Vote,
USA
TODAY,
Mar.
17,
2014,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/17/white-housesanctions-russia-officials-ukraine/6518417/.
197 Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 78, at 370-75.
198 Id. at 342-50; Thomas M. Frank, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100
A.J.I.L. 88, 97 (2006) (stating that the Bush administration continued to
promote myths of connections between al-Qaeda and Iraq and of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction even though there was no evidence, and remarking
that they “prefer[red] to live in a bubble of false information, rather than
stand exposed as facilitators of what is defined as aggression”).
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After the invasion, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan remarked that, “from our point of view, [and] from the
Charter point of view, it was illegal.”199 As a response to the
invasion of Iraq, the U.N. Secretary-Generals’ High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change was constituted and
concluded that the context of the Iraq invasion would make
such a military attack illegal.200 Nelson Mandela, the late former South Africa President and Nobel Laureate, stated of the
Bush Administration’s bellicosity that led to the Iraq War:
“What I am condemning is . . . one power, with a president who
has no foresight, who cannot think properly. . .If there is any
country that has committed unspeakable atrocities in the
world, it is the United States of America. They don’t care.”201
There were 116 Non-Aligned Movement countries and 57 Organization of the Islamic Conference members opposed to the
use of force against Iraq.202 One week into the invasion, the 22

199 Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, BBC, Sept. 16, 2004, available at
http://new.bbc.co.uk!2/hi/3661134/stm; Felicity Barringer, Annan Warns of
World Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A16 (Annan calling the action a
threat to the U.N.’s viability that placed the Security Council system in “crisis”); Malaysian PM Condemns Iraq War, BBC, Mar. 24, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/2880519.stm (reporting that
the Malaysian Prime Minister sought to bring criminal charges for the invasion).
200 HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE, A MORE
SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 63, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess.,
U.N.
Doc.
A/59/565
(Dec.
2,
2004),
available
at
https://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pd
f (“in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order
and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply
too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action”); Sean D. Murphy,
Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 177 (2004) (explaining that the Bush Administration’s legal theory was “not persuasive”); Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J.
INT’L L. 607, 608 (2003) (stating that a few Bush Administration lawyers still
offered “self-defense” or anteceding collective security authorizations by the
Security Council as rationales, but political officials “boldly proclaim[ed] a
new policy that openly repudiates the Article 2(4) obligation”).
201 Jarrett Murphy, Mandela Slams Bush on Iraq, CBS NEWS, Jan. 30,
2003 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/0 I/30/iraq/main538607.shtml.
202 U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4726th mtg. at 17, 28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726
(Mar. 26, 2003) (Brazilian delegation remarked that it “profoundly deplore[s]
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members of the Arab League held an emergency summit in
Cairo and adopted a unanimous resolution, with only Kuwait
abstaining that, “demanded the immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of U.S. and British forces from Iraq” and pronounced that the attack was a “violation of the United Nations
Charter and a threat to world peace.”203 While Spanish Prime
Minister Jose Maria Aznar was one of President Bush’s spotlighted coalition members prior to the invasion,204 one year after the war, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the new Spanish
prime minister referenced Iraq and remarked: “pre-emptive
wars, never again; violations of international law, never
again.”205 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the International Criminal
Court’s chief prosecutor, stated that President Bush or British
Prime Minister Tony Blair might one day have to answer investigations on war crimes charges.206 In September 2012, Nobel Laureate Desmond Tutu “called . . . for Tony Blair and
George Bush to face prosecution at the International Criminal
Court for their role in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.”207
the initiation of military action and, in particular, the fact that force has been
used without the express authorization of the Security Council”).
203
Arab States Line Up Behind Iraq, BBC, Mar. 25, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2882851.stm; Final Communique of
the Thirty-first Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Istanbul, para. 41 (June 16, 2004), reprinted in Report of the Secretary-General on
the Work of the Organization, UN Doc. A/58/856-S/2004/582, at 6, 13 (stating
that the Conference adamantly rejected “the principle of preemptive military
strikes against any country under any pretext whatsoever”).
204 Full Text: Azores Press Conference, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 17, 2005,
http://theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/17/iraq.politics2.
205 Iraq Proves Pre-emptive Wars Fail: Spanish PM, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 3, 2004; Debate: “Will Hussein Get a Fair Trial?”, 37 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 21, 23-24 (2006/2007) (stating that Professor Doebbler noted that during his discussions with internationa11awyers and political representatives
from sixty countries, all called the aggression “illegal” and the only arguments came from U.S. lawyers).
206 Gethin Chamberlain, Court ‘Can Envisage’ Blair Prosecution, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH,
Mar.
18,
2007,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1545876/Court-can-envisage-Blairprosecution.html.
207 Tutu: Bush, Blair Should Face Trial at the Hague, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Sept. 2, 2012, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/
2012-09-02/tutu-bush-iraq/57534404/1.
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For the following chronological detail relating to the inference that the war would be forthcoming irrespective of the
veracity of allegations about illicit weapons and security
threats and whether there was a legal basis to use force, it is
important to underscore that the invasion of Iraq took place on
March 19, 2003 and that post-war investigations determined
that Iraq had no WMDs or ties to al-Qaeda.208 According to
former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill’s interview on 60
Minutes, the newly-inaugurated president tasked appointees to
search for ways to overthrow the Iraqi regime at the first National Security Council meetings in January and February
2001.209 The New York Times sued the Department of Defense
in a Freedom of Information Act action and in 2008 finally obtained 8,000 pages of “e-mail messages, transcripts and records
describing years of private briefings” and discovered that
Bush’s appointees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense developed a program that would employ “independent” military
analysts who would appear in the national news to persuade an
unwilling American populace for an invasion and occupation of
Iraq.210 The New York Times reported that the program was
developed before 9/11, and that the propaganda program was

208

875-77.

Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 78, at 817-19, 858-59,

209 Based on former Secretary of Treasury Paul O’Neill’s startling interview on 60 Minutes in 2004 and from the accounts of other officials, top Bush
Administration officials examined methods to depose the Iraqi government at
the first White House National Security Council meetings in January and
February 2001. Robert Bejesky, Politico-International Law, 57 LOY. L. REV.
29, 63-64 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Politico]; Robert Bejesky, Geopolitics,
Oil Law Reform, and Commodity Market Expectations, 63 OKLA. L. REV.
193, 215-20, 229-31 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky, Geopolitics] (explaining that
the White House established a Future of Iraq Project in early 2002, which selected Iraqi defectors to generate several volumes of advisory reports for government and private sector reform during a planned occupation of Iraq, and
referencing that those defectors became prominent government officials in
Iraq after Hussein’s regime was ousted); Eric Schmitt & James Dao, Iraq is
Focal Point as Bush Meets with Joint Chiefs, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 11, 2001), at
A20 (noting the focus on Iraq even prior to inauguration).
210 David Barstow, Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand: Courting Ex-Officers Tied to Military Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at
A1.
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implemented and carried out for several years.211 Appointees
within the Secretary of Defense for Policy established an Office
of Special Plans,212 which, according to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s investigation, was an unofficial and
unauthorized intelligence unit within the Office of the Secretary of Defense that created and provided unsubstantiated allegations about threats from Iraq to the White House.213
Iraqi defectors, who desired regime change, held a favorable relationship with the Bush administration and appeared
in the media with terrorist and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapon allegations after the initial White House National
Security Council meetings and after 9/11.214 The Bush Administration commenced a White House-based Future of Iraq Project in early 2002 and staffed the project with defectors who
proposed economic, social and government reforms in the event
211

Id.
Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of ProcurementAided Unilateralism as a Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 33
(2007).
213 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF
PRE-IRAQI WAR ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
FOR
POLICY,
Feb.
9,
2007,
available
at
http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2007/images/02/09/dodig.execsummary.020907.pdf;
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RELATING TO IRAQ CONDUCTED BY THE POLICY COUNTERTERRORISM EVALUATION
GROUP AND THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PLANS WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 2, S. REP. NO. 108-301, June 5, 2008 (Senator Levin criticizing and proposing to “Review the activities of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy” in September 2005).
214 Robert Bejesky, Defectors and the Moral Hazard Problem, 5 WM. &
MARY POL’Y REV. (Forthcoming 2014); Bejesky, Politico, supra note 209, at 6266. The Administration increased funding to the Iraqi National Congress,
the group of defectors assembled by the CIA in the early 1990s, and they
sourced information pertaining to military operations, weapons, war crimes,
and internal developments inside Iraq. S. REP. 109-330, at 30 (stating that
between May and July, “[t]he National Security Council Deputies Committee
decided that the [INC] program should be continued”); Martin Kettle, Bush
Funds
Iraqi
Opposition,
GUARDIAN
UK,
Feb.
2,
2001,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/feb/03/iraq.usa.
In May 2002, the
State Department ceased funding the INC, but two months later Bush’s National Security Council reapproved INC operations; and in late-October 2002
the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (“DIA”) accepted responsibility
for the INC. S. REP. 109-330, at 30-31.
212
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of the overthrow of Hussein’s regime.215 The Bush White
House constituted an Office of Global Communication (OGC)
that spearheaded the operations of public relations (PR)
firms.216 Consequently, PR firms introduced talking points
about Iraq for the president and other top officials,217 including
by using defector accounts218 and coached dissidents on strategies to appear cogent in the mass media, while flooding the
media with the White House’s message.219 The Times of London wrote that the OGC earmarked $200 million for a “PR blitz
against Saddam Hussein . . . [to persuade] American and foreign audiences, particularly in Arab nations skeptical of U.S.

Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 209, at 215-19.
Robert Bejesky, Public Diplomacy or Propaganda? Targeted Messages
and Tardy Corrections to Unverified Reporting, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 967, 992,
1033-34 (2012).
217 GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE’S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED
STATES, AND THE RISE OF THE NEW IMPERIALISM 229 (2006); Martha Brant,
West Wing Story: Ladies and Gentlemen . . . the Band, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18,
2002, http://www.newsweek.com/west-wing-story-ladies-and-gentlemen-band144997 (emphasizing the Bush Administration’s depth and expanse of information domination that marketed war); Douglas Quenqua, U.S. Training
Iraqis in Media to Raise Support for Attack, PR WEEK, Sept. 2, 2002,
http://www.prweekus.com/article/us-training-iraqis-media-raise-supportattack/1233725 (reporting that the “State Department has begun providing
media training to a handful of Iraqi dissident who will help make the Bush
administration’s argument for the removal of Saddam Hussein.”).
218 See S. REP. 109-330, at 187 (noting that seven of the fifteen SSCI Senators believed that the investigation should have more deeply assessed the
false information that the INC directly transmitted to the Bush Administration and U.S. government agencies, which bypassed the Intelligence Community). The Director of the INC’s Washington office wrote in a June 26, 2002
memo to the Senate Appropriations Committee that justified its funding:
“[d]efectors, reports, and raw intelligence are cultivated and analyzed and the
results are reported through the INC newspaper (Al Mutamar), the [A]rabic
and western media and to appropriate governmental, non-governmental and
international agencies . . . [and to] U.S. Governmental recipients . . . [in] the
Department of Defense [and the White House].” Id. This memo was delivered while the State Department had responsibility for monitoring INC activities and the memo revealed that the five individuals on the team who analyzed and processed the raw data for Al Mutamar’s reports were all inner
members of the INC. James Risen, Data From Iraqi Exiles Under Scrutiny:
War Critics Say U.S. Relied Too Much on Dubious Information, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2004, at A16.
219 GRANDIN, supra note 217, at 229.
215
216
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policy in the region [and utilized] . . . advertising techniques to
persuade crucial target groups that the Iraqi leader must be
ousted.”220
Covert operations were designed for Iraq. In late 2001,
Bush approved covert operations for the CIA (called “Anabasis”) that consisted of implementing propaganda operations inside Iraq that would disseminate that the regime was under
threat and designing plans for blowing up railroad lines and
communication towers and assassinating key officials, all of
which could impel retaliation and initiate a war.221 In April
2002, Anabasis involved recruiting Kurds for operations that
would have endangered their lives if the Iraqi government had
discovered the operations, but to induce Kurds to participate,
CIA officials and the Bush Administration guaranteed that
there would be a military invasion.222 Indeed, President Bush
tasked military commanders with developing war plans starting in November 2001 and received periodic briefings on sequential iterations of the war plans, while officials publicly denied that there were war plans or diverted the topic when
journalists inquired.223
All of this preplanning for war began long before Congress and the United Nations Security Council even contemplated the issue of Iraq in September and October of 2002, but
the publicity was already convincing the American public of the
peril from Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction.224 What
befell at the international level and led to an invasion without
Security Council approval was opprobrious, but strife also de-

220 Shelton Rampton & John Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception: The
Uses of Propaganda in Bush’s War on Iraq 38 (2003).
221 Michael Isikoff & David Corn, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin,
Scandal, and Selling of the Iraq War 7-8, 10, 153, 155-57 (2006).
222 Id. at 10-12, 47, 82, 156.
223 BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 3-4, 30-31, 34-37, 40, 42, 55-59, 7579, 96-103, 120-25, 129-30, 137, 157-59, 188 (2004). There was an early political agenda to go to war, and by mid-2002, the media announced that there
were indeed war plans and that U.S. troops were being deployed to countries
contiguous to Iraq. Bejesky, Politico, supra note 209, at 62-70.
224 Robert Bejesky, Press Clause Aspirations and the Iraq War, 48
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 343, 348-50, 352-53 (2012).
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veloped on constitutional war powers, which calls for an assessment of domestic-level official immunities and an examination of whether equity might gainsay grounds for granting immunity.
C. Domestic Level: Public Policy and Comity
1. Official Immunities and the FTCA/FELRTCA
The extent to which US law affords civil immunity to US
government officials can be relevant to equity and comity considerations, to provide a signal for US policy if a US court is requested to enforce a foreign court’s judgment, and to indicate
whether a foreigner can initiate a civil claim against a US official in American courts. Substantive international law prohibits wars of aggression, U.S. law proscribes war crimes,225 and
potential theories of culpability identify those who can be held
liable for transgressing international law, but there are substantial hurdles that prevent U.S. courts from rendering criminal punishment or civil damages on US government officials.
Sovereign immunity has historically bestowed U.S. government officials with plenary immunity for ex officio duties,
including for tortious conduct,226 so that political leaders and
administrators can exercise reasonable and efficient discretion
without presentiment of punishment227 or the specter of frivo-

225

Samuel Brenner, “I am a Bit Sickened”: Examining Archetypes of Congressional War Crimes Oversight After My Lai and Abu Ghraib, 205 MIL L. REV. 1,
10 (2010); David Scheffer, Closing the Impunity Gap in U.S. Law, 8 NW. U.J.
INT’L HUM. RTS., 30, 24 (2009) (“United States remains in large measure a free
haven for perpetrators of crimes against humanity [including for] . . . any U.S.
citizen who may perpetrate a crime against humanity overseas.”).
226 Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 599-603 (2005) (barring suits
against the U.S. under sovereign immunity); 1 LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C.
LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS §2.02 (2005).
227 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-40 (1974); Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, pmbl., Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
(stating that “the purpose of such privileges and immunities [for diplomatic
officials] is . . . to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing states”)
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lous lawsuits.228 Exceptions to permit plaintiff claims are
found in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Bivens
Doctrine, which is available against individuals.229
The FTCA can waive sovereign immunity for tort claims
committed by U.S. government employees,230 making the claim
available in a manner that would be comparable to a lawsuit
against a private individual.231 A plaintiff can initiate the suit
against the United States when government officials or employees commit torts while acting within the “scope of employment,” which permits substituting the United States as the defendant.232 However, the FTCA excludes cases involving
military combat activities during wartime and “claim[s] arising
in a foreign country.”233
Sovereign immunity and the list of FTCA exclusions do not
impede plaintiffs from suing government actors in a “personal

228 Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715,
723-24 (2006) (stating that official immunity provides protection from money
damage suits for claims arising from government actors’ official conduct).
229 Carlson v. Groen, 446 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1980) (“Four additional factors,
each suggesting that the Bivens remedy is more effective than the FTCA
remedy, also support our conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit respondent to the FTCA action . . . “[T]he Bivens remedy in addition to compensating victims, serves a deterrent purpose. Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA
remedy against the United States.”). **(quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971))
230 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680 (2013).
231 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2013) (“The United States shall be liable, respecting
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall
not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages”).
232 See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2013); 28
U.S.C. 1346(b) (2013); See also, Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture All in a Day’s
Work? Scope of Employment, the Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human
Rights Litigation Against U.S. Federal Officials, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
175, 176 (2008).
233 See, e.g., § 2680; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 (2004)
(holding that the FTCA’s “exception bars all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission
occurred.”); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating that combatant activities are those “activities both necessary to and
in direct connection with actual hostilities”).
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capacity” suit,234 which is still generally defended by the Department of Justice.235 Under Bivens, a government agent,
sued in personal capacity for a claim for damages, will have
qualified immunity if there is no violation of a clearly established constitutional right or if a constitutional deprivation resulted from a government agent’s reasonable mistake.236 Given
that novel Bivens challenges have been relatively ineffectual
over the past three decades,237 it is improbable that Iraqis
would have U.S. constitutional rights for a deprivation of their
public right to antiquities in their country due to the directives
of U.S. government agents who executed a war and occupation.238

Seamon, supra note 228, at 722-23.
See, Paul Michael Brown, Personal Liability Tort Litigation Against
Federal Employees: A Primer, 8 ST. THOMAS L.J. 329, 329 (2011) (reporting
that the Department of Justice represents thousands of federal employees
each year in personal civil liability suits).
236 See e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (holding that
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”); See generally, John C. Williams, Qualifying
Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1296-97 (2012).
237 George D. Brown, ‘Counter-Counter-Terrorism Via Lawsuit’ – The
Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 845 (2009) (stating that since 1983,
the Supreme Court has rejected the past seven attempts to apply Bivens actions in new factual scenarios, based generally on political question grounds).
238 Foreigners in a zone of occupation are unlikely to have rights under
the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693
(2001)(holding that it is “well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens
outside our geographic borders”); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 76566, 778 (1950)(holding that nineteen alien petitioners, who were convicted by
a U.S. military commission for taking hostile actions against the U.S. in China and were currently being held in a German prison, were not protected under the Constitution as an American citizen abroad would be protected); Id.
at 779 (“It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission
to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.”); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (per curiam) (denying habeas relief under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to Japanese officials who
were convicted by the U.S. military tribunal in Japan, despite that the U.S.
234
235
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Likewise, in Westfall v. Erwin, the Court held that absolute immunity is afforded to federal officials under state tort
law when acting within the scope of employment, but not when
torts were committed outside official duties and when officials
239
After the Supreme Court’s decision in
acted discretionarily.
Westfall, Congress quickly enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (FELRTCA)
to accord absolute immunity to U.S. government officials in civ240
and for omisil suits for claims arising in foreign countries
sions, negligent, or wrongful acts that those officials commit
241
How“while acting within the scope of [their] employment.”

occupied and effectively controlled Japan); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d
311, 320-23 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that nonresident aliens that are seized
and detained outside U.S. borders do not have constitutional rights). But see,
e.g., Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 698-99 (1862) (stating that only Congress has the authority to “change the country and all its citizens from a state
of peace to a state of war,” which meant that the President did not have
“power to set on foot a blockade under the law of nations, and that the capture of the vessel and cargo in this case, and in all cases before us in which
the capture occurred before the 13th of July, 1861, for breach of blockade, or
as enemies’ property, are illegal and void, and that the decrees of condemnation should be reversed and the vessel and cargo restored.”). It is also unlikely that U.S. citizens would have rights of indemnity against the President or
other government agents if Iraqis attained remedial relief out of the U.S.
Treasury for stolen antiquities.
239 See, Westfall v. Irwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297-298 (1988); See also, Doe. v.
Millan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
240 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, §2679, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2680k (2012))(noting that exceptions to liability include “[a]ny
claim arising in a foreign country”)
241 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2012); In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479
F. Supp. 2d 85, 107-09 (D. D.C. 2007) (noting that qualified immunity is
granted to employees and officials accused of torture). FELRTCA eliminated
the discretionary prong at the common law and granted absolute immunity to
all federal employees irrespective of whether the employee was acting discretionarily and committing a common law tort. United States v. Smith, 499
U.S. 160 (1991). Consequently, a plaintiff’s typical challenge under the
FELRTCA would be to assert that the employees were acting outside the
scope of their employment. In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d
at 110, aff’d sub nom. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2011); AlZahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 105, 108 (D. D.C. 2010) (dismissing suit against employees and U.S. government). If they were acting within
the scope of their official duties, the FTCA provides the exclusive remedy for
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ever, the policy underlying FELRTCA may not have been intended to shelter officials for intentional or criminal wrongs.242
Similar to the immunity afforded to heads of state at the
international level, the US Supreme Court has ruled that the
President is absolutely immune for official acts taken while in
office because of the possibility that the President could be disrupted from official duties by plaintiffs with civil damage
claims.243 Additionally, courts and Congress defer to executive
prerogative when national security is involved,244 top officials
may have absolute immunity for civil damages for acts in their
“discretionary authority in such sensitive areas as national security or foreign policy,”245 and the Court has been reluctant to
examine the scope of the Commander in Chief authority on political questions, standing, ripeness, and mootness grounds after dozens of cases challenged presidential power during the
a federal employee’s common law torts. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2013).
FELRTCA immunity is inapplicable to legal actions against federal employees when they violate the Constitution or federal statutes, in which case qualified immunity applies. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) (2013); See Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 807.
242 The FELRTCA was designed to protect government employees when
they act negligently within the scope of their employment, but not to provide
shelter for intentional torts or criminal acts. BETH STEPHENS, JUDITH
CHOMSKY, JENNIFER GREEN, PAUL HOFFMAN & MICHAEL RATNER,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURT 291-95 (2d. ed.
2008); See generally Brief for United States Representative Barney Frank as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant Jennifer K. Harbury at 3-4, Harbury v.
Hayden, 522 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 06-5282); H.R. REP. NO. 100-700,
at 5 (1988) (writing that the FELRTCA was intended to make federal employees immune from suit by making the United States defend the case, unless the government defendant is accused of egregious misconduct). This is
consistent with precedent. See e.g. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322
(1975) (an official would not have qualified immunity if the official “knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the constitutional right of the affected, or
if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury”).
243 See, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
244 Robert Bejesky, Cognitive Foreign Policy: Linking Al Qaeda and Iraq,
56 HOW. L.J. 1, 10-13 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, CFP]; Robert Bejesky, National Security Information Flow: From Source to Reporter’s Privilege, 24 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 399, 402-05 (2012).
245 See e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812.
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Vietnam War.246 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
long held “that when the President takes official action, the
Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted
within the law”247 and held that the President was not even
temporarily immune from civil lawsuits unrelated to official
functions while holding office.248 The next section provides a
synopsis of the questionable constitutional basis of the Iraq
war.

246 See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613–16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (refusing
to rule on the constitutionality of the Vietnam War based on the political
question doctrine); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147–48 (2d Cir. 1973)
(holding that the lawfulness of the President’s directive to mine ports in
North Vietnam was a non-justiciable political question); Massachusetts v.
Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 28–34 (1st Cir. 1971) (“[I]n a situation of prolonged but
undeclared hostilities, where the executive continues to act not only in the
absence of any conflicting congressional claim of authority but with steady
congressional support, the Constitution has not been breached.”); Orlando v.
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042-44 (2d. Cir. 1971) (holding that determining the
constitutionality of the Vietnam War was beyond the scope of judicial review); Robert Bejesky, War Powers Pursuant to False Perceptions and Asymmetric Information in the “Zone of Twilight,” 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 64-67, 86
(2012) (noting that the Court had regularly granted certiorari on the Congress-Executive division on the implementation of war powers acts for over
150 years). Courts refused to hear cases regarding President Reagan’s actions in Central America after twenty-nine members of Congress challenged
the action in federal court. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 334, 339–41
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208–09 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 895, 898–903 (D.C. Cir.
1982). Members of Congress similarly challenged President Clinton’s airstrikes in Kosovo, but once more, the court refused to hear the case. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20–24 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
247 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997); El-Masri v. United States,
479 F.3d 296, 312 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing that El-Masri is an alleged kidnapping and torture case) (noting also if the President asserts executive
privilege, it is “the [C]ourt, not the Executive that determines whether the
state secret privilege has been properly invoked”). Also, the leading immunity case for acts relating to official functions involved President Nixon’s unlawfully firing of a Defense Department analyst over adverse testimony before Congress. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 731. This was an important
substantive matter but it was not directly an act that would reverberate into
war crimes or an unconstitutional foundation for war that impacts the entire
country.
248 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 681.
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2. Execution of Constitutional War Powers in the 2003
Invasion
US law would not likely favor plaintiff claims against US
officials for losses deriving from the pillaging of the Iraq National Museum. The possibility of US courts accepting a case
against the President without a finding that the Executive was
acting outside the scope of presidential authority is remote,
which suggests that US policy would also be unlikely to favor
enforcing a foreign judgment against the President even if ICJ
and customary international law restrictions on head of state
immunity could be overcome. Nonetheless, this section presents an overview of domestic level political events to permit
the reader to query whether American democracy should accommodate a point at which negligence or misconduct should
retard the presumption that the President retains a virtual
impervious immunity.249
The domestic constitutional process leading to the Iraq
War was highly-problematic as indicated by later debate over
censuring President Bush on the false allegations about weapons of mass destruction and statements that Iraq’s former regime had connections to al-Qaeda250 and by the 251 to 166 vote
in the House of Representatives which referred articles of impeachment against the president to the House of Representa249 Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 132 (2009) (speaking generally, “[i]f nations are
viewed as unitary entities in the international arena, there must be one governmental entity that can be held accountable for a nation’s actions in foreign
affairs, and for the U.S., that can only be the executive branch.”).
250 Campaign Opens for Censure of Bush, REUTERS, Mar. 18, 2004, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/mar/18/nation/na-antiwar18 (stating
that “[m]ilitary families and antiwar activists urged Congress to censure
President Bush for what they called his deception and manipulation of intelligence before the Iraq war.”); New calls for censure emerged after Democrats
took control of the House and Senate. Justin Blum, Bush Should Be Censured by U.S. Congress on Iraq, Senator Says, BLOOMBERG, July 22, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6RBOFNygHQ
A (stating that the proposed censure motion “would criticize Bush for ‘overstating the case’ that Saddam Hussein . . .had weapons of mass destruction
[and for] . . . ‘falsely implying’ a relationship between Hussein and the terrorist group al-Qaeda and of having ‘liinks’ to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks”).
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tives Judiciary Committee.251 The Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (SSCI) completed its five-year investigation of the
conditions leading to the Iraq War and the SSCI Chair stated
that, “the Bush Administration led the nation to war under
false pretenses.”252
Congress granted an Authorization for the Use of Force
(AUMF) based on the Bush administration allegations of a
supposed arsenal of prohibited weapons inside Iraq and did not
condition the need to use force on displacing a foreign government.253 Professors Ackerman and Hathaway emphasize that
the AUMF was a limited authorization to use force conditioned
on there being an actual imminent threat, which means that
when the White House began offering additional rationalizations after the war began, particularly of humanitarian intervention, “such talk was blatantly inconsistent with the plain
language of the 2002 resolution.”254 The detriment to Ameri-

251 Kucinich Effort to Impeach Bush Kicked into Limbo, CNN, June 11,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/11/kucinich.impeach.vote/ (emphasizing that most of the resolution dealt with manufacturing false claims
for the Iraq War); Dennis J. Kucinich, Articles of Impeachment of President
George W. Bush, arts. I-III (June 10, 2008), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20080920014632/http://kucinich.house.gov/News/D
ocumentPrint.aspx?DocumentID=93581 (involving the use of secret propaganda to “manufacture a false case for war against Iraq,” misrepresenting
that there was Iraqi complicity in 9/11, and “Misleading the American People
and Members of Congress to Believe Iraq Possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction, to Manufacture a False Case for War”).
252 Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Press Release of Intelligence
Committee
(June
5,
2008),
http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=298775
(quoting
SSCI
Chairman John D. Rockefeller). The stimulus to action was formulated via
propaganda, high level directives, and political initiatives within the Bush
administration. See supra Part IV(B)(4).
253 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002, H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. § 3 (2002) [hereinafter AUMF-Iraq]. The
President understood that the terms were conditions because he reiterated
them verbatim in a letter to Congress two days before the attack to comply
with the 48-hour information requirement in § 2(b). Letter from George W.
Bush, President of the U.S., to Speaker of the H.R. (Mar. 19, 2003), available
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/19/iraq/main544604.shtml.
254 Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 464
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cans was ominous as the war and occupation resulted in 4,488
U.S. military deaths and 134,000 Iraqi civilian deaths and cost
American taxpayers $2.2 trillion dollars.255
The White House actuated puissant agenda setting for
war.256 A significant percentage of the American public was
primed to believe the threat claims ostensibly because of the
frequent reiteration of false allegations, but members of Congress opposed a rapid approval for the AUMF and complained
that the Bush Administration was pushing the issue up against
the November 2002 elections to pressure Democrats to authorize the use of force.257 One of the staunchest opponents was
Senator Byrd who observed the evidentiary foundation and ac-

(2011); Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 78, at 350-69.
255 CBS Evening News for Mar. 19, 2013 (news clip on file with author);
See generally, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION
DOLLAR WAR: THE TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT (2008) (estimating even
more dire economic costs to $3 trillion by including derivative expenditures);
Bejesky, Politico, supra note 209, at 84-91 (addressing a chronology of how
the administration avoided discussion of expenses and negative ramifications
on the American economy).
256 Charles Lewis & Mark Reading-Smith, False Pretenses, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY,
Jan.
23,
2008,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2008/01/23/5641/false-pretenses
(depicting
that administration officials made approximately 300% more false statements about threats from Iraq than in the previous month); See generally supra Part IV(B)(4).
257 SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY’S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, S. REP. NO. 108301, at 12, 299 (2004) (noting that several members of Congress objected to
authorizing the use of force without having more information, and disapproved of the President speaking publicly about dangers without an NIE);
Jeffrey A. Botelho, Congressional Responsibility in Controlling the War Machine, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 305 (2008-2009) (reporting that CNN noted that
the Executive’s advocacy elevated political stakes: “He has democrats in a box
. . . It’s very hard for them to oppose the president, especially just weeks before the November election.”); Editorial, The Politics of War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20,
2002,
at
A26,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/20/opinion/the-politics-of-war.html
(“The
newly bellicose mood on Capitol Hill materialized almost overnight. Last
night, Democrats wanted the Security Council to act first and were calling for
measured consideration of the political and military issues involved in going
to war. The haste . . . is clearly motivated by campaign politics. Republicans
are already running attack ads against Democrats on Iraq”).
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centuated that the President was using “absurd pressure to act
[twenty-seven] days before an election.” 258 Byrd further expounded: “And before we put this great nation on the track to
war I want to see more evidence, hard evidence, not more Presidential rhetoric.”259
Many Intelligence Community officials and experts
acknowledged that intelligence was being crafted around the
executive’s policy of invasion.260 Georgetown Professor Paul
Pillar, a retired senior CIA analyst, explaining that “intelli-

258 Senator Robert C. Byrd, Congress Must Resist the Rush to War, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/10/opinion/congressmust-resist-the-rush-to-war.html (“Are we too feeble to resist the demands of
a president who is determined to bend the collective will of Congress to his
will . . . I have searched for that single piece of evidence that would convince
me that the president must have in his hands, before the month is out, openended Congressional authorization to deliver an unprovoked attack on Iraq. I
remain unconvinced”); 148 CONG. REC. 19682 (Oct. 9, 2002) (Senator Patrick
Leahy) (stating that “[m]any respected and knowledgeable people—former
senior military officers and diplomats among them—have expressed strong
reservations about this resolution. . . . But they have not seen that evidence,
and neither have I. We have heard a lot of bellicose rhetoric, but what are the
facts?”).
259 ROBERT C. BYRD, LOSING AMERICA: CONFRONTING A RECKLESS AND
ARROGANT PRESIDENCY 233 (2004) (Statement on floor of Senate, Oct. 10,
2002).
260 See generally Robert Bejesky, The SSCI Investigation of the Iraq War:
Part II: Politicization of Intelligence, 40 S.U. L. REV. 243 (2013). The Bush
Administration initiated agenda setting with allegations and demanded a
congressional vote and a UN authorization to use force six months before the
war actually occurred. Robert Bejesky, Political Penumbras of Taxes and
War Powers for the 2012 Election, 14 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 19-30 (2012); Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 78, at 303-15. This agenda setting was
prior to the Intelligence Community taking any steps toward the production
of the high-flawed and condemned (in process and substance) National Intelligence Estimate. See Robert Bejesky, The SSCI Investigation of the Iraq
War: Part I: A Split Decision, 40 S.U. L. REV. 1 (2012). Senators requested
that an NIE be produced because one had never been produced that was devoted to Iraqi WMD programs. S. REP. NO. 108-301, at 298. The work
launched on September 12 at the National Intelligence Office under CIA Director Tenet’s guidance and eleven days later the draft NIE was distributed
to agencies, and one week later the final copy was distributed. Id. at 9, 12-13,
52 (noting that agencies received the draft on September 23). Experts estimated that a more reasonable time frame for production for such a complex
NIE might reasonably have taken between three to six months. Id. at 11.
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gence was misused publicly to justify decisions already made”
and that the “intelligence community’s own work was politicized.” 261 The SSCI quoted an analyst who was involved in the
production of the notorious NIE and stated “[T]he going-in assumption was we were going to war, so this NIE was to be written with that in mind. We were going to war, which meant
American men and women had to be properly given the benefit
of the doubt of what they would face. . .That was what was said
to us.”262 The account is consistent with all of the laterreleased revelations about preplanning for war that was emphasized in Part IV(B)(4).
Thus, the justification for the use of force, as specified in
diplomacy before the UN and as contained in the AUMF-Iraq
several days after the NIE was prepared, exclusively involved
possession of weapons that were prohibited by UN Resolution
and could pose a security threat.263 However, the analyst surprisingly asserted that the intelligence community prepared
the NIE, which specified the evidence for war pursuant to Congress’s request, under the assumption that the war was inevitable. Ironically, one month after the war, ABC News interviewed Bush Administration officials who stated that they did

261 Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq, FOR. AFFAIRS,
Mar./Apr.
2006
available
at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61503/paul-r-pillar/intelligencepolicyand-the-war-in-ira.
262 S. REP. NO. 108-301, at 505; JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR 79-80 (2006)
(writing about interviews taken at a CIA meeting, a CIA official remarked
that they were told from the senior officials from CIA headquarters to the
station chiefs was simple: “The game is on. We are going to war in Iraq.
There will be no further debate on the issue. . ..”[One official remarked:] “We
kept saying that the president has decided we are going to war, and if you
don’t like it, quit.”); JAMES BAMFORD, A PRETEXT FOR WAR 333-37 (2004) (writing about high-level directives that were given at a CIA meeting in January
2003, “[I]f Bush wants to go to war, it’s your job to give him a reason to do so.
. ..”[One of the attendees interpreted the directive:] “This is something that
the American public, if they ever heard, if they ever knew, they would be outraged.. . .”[Another CIA officer stated:]It was criminal the way we were implicitly deceiving people”).
263 AUMF-Iraq, supra note 253, § 3; Letter from George W. Bush, supra
note 253; Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 254, at 464; Bejesky, Weapon
Inspections, supra note 78, at 350-69.
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not lie, but that “the administration emphasized the danger of
Saddam’s weapons to gain the legal justification for war from
the United Nations and to stress the danger at home to Americans.”264 The Bush Administration officials stated that there
was a new reason for war, which was to exhibit “a global show
of American power and democracy.”265
With respect to the failure to protect antiquities during the
war, in September 2004, anonymous government officials
“leaked” the contents of two classified reports prepared specifically for President Bush by the National Intelligence Council
three months before the war.266 The reports assessed that an
invasion “would result in a deeply divided Iraqi society prone to
violent internal conflict,”267 which could be a warning that societal unrest and conflict could endanger the Iraq National Museum. Hence, the Bush Administration dismissed intelligence
reports that predicted insurgencies and societal violence after
an invasion as “just guessing”268 and provided express and im-

264 John Cochran, Officials: 9/11 Was Main Reason for War, ABC NEWS,
Apr. 26, 2003,http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=128467&page=1.
265 Id.
266 See generally Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq, S. Rep. No. 110-76 (2007) (reviewing
the studies).
267 Douglas Jehl & David E. Sanger, Prewar Assessment on Iraq Saw
Chance
of
Strong
Divisions,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
28,
2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/28/politics/28intel.html?pagewanted=all
(warning that Hussein supporters and insurgents would possibly wage guerrilla warfare and an “insurgency against the new Iraqi government or American-led forces….”); S. REP. NO. 110-76, at 93-106 (noting that pre-war assessments published by other agencies in the weeks prior to the invasion
presumed there would be an invasion of Iraq and public accounts of violent
events inside Iraq in many cases did resemble the claims in the reports). The
January 2003 National Intelligence Council reports assessed that establishing a viable democracy in Iraq would be a long and turbulent process, that it
would be necessary for an outside military to occupy the country because it
would be a “deeply divided society,” that oil revenues would make the political and economic restructuring less difficult, that there would be humanitarian and refugee challenges, and that there would be outside malevolent forces
undermining American efforts. S. REP. NO. 110-76, at 4 (citing NIC,
PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES IN A POST-SADDAM IRAQ 5-6, 25-28 (Jan. 2003); NIC,
REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ 18, 20 (Jan. 2003)).
268 Jehl & Sanger, supra note 267. See also Douglas Jehl, U.S. Intelli-
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plicit portrayals to the American public before the war that
there would be no post-war conflict (other than from holdovers
allegiant to Hussein),269 but considered the allegations in the
NIE about threats that led to war so ironclad that the White
House spent six months persuading Americans to accept the allegations.270
V. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
The Iraqi Interior Ministry’s Economic Crimes Department’s investigations seek to reacquire antiquities that were
looted from the Iraq National Museum in April 2003. The ransacking unfolded after domestic law and order dissolved following what many called an illegal war.271 International law and
Iraqi law provide a substantive basis for a duty to protect the
items in the Iraqi National Museum, which suffered losses that
would likely not have occurred “but for” the war of aggression

gence Shows Pessimism on Iraq’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/16/politics/16intel.html?pagewanted=print&
position= (White House Press Secretary McClellan remarked: “You know,
every step of the way in Iraq there have been pessimists and hand-wringers
who said it can’t be done. . . And every step of the way, the Iraqi leadership
and the Iraqi people have proven them wrong because they are determined to
have a free and peaceful future”). The Bush Administration also ignored the
advice of the U.S. military commanders who assumed it would be costly to
enforce a peacekeeping effort and who recalled how societal chaos can erupt
after a powerful leader is deposed, which had just recently occurred in the
former Yugoslavia. Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, A National Security Agenda
Revisited, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 829 850-51 (2010).
269 James C. O’Brien, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Warlords and Reconstruction After Iraq, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y99, 102-03 (2004); Department of Defense Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2004: Hearing Before
the H. Budget Comm., 108th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2003) (statement of Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Sec’y of Def.) (“It’s hard to conceive that it would take
more forces to provide stability to post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to
conduct the war itself and secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces
and his army. Hard to imagine.”).
270 See generally Bejesky, Cognitive Foreign Policy, supra note 244; Bejesky, CFP, supra note 244; Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 277,
at 875-82.
271 See supra Parts III, IV(B)(4).
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or if the invading/occupying force had secured the museum.272
This article presented a hypothetical assessment of a tort lawlike damage remedy, with a pivotal procedural question of
whether a plaintiff-government (or a non-government actor in a
qui tam form of action given the political discord at stake)273
could sue in an Iraqi court against a foreign state, the head of
state, or lower-level officials, as a civil defendant. The article
also estimated—using the US as an example—what level of
sovereign or official immunity might be afforded in the official’s
home jurisdiction, either as the court system accepting jurisdiction or the forum being requested to enforce the judgment of an
Iraqi court, and employed the precedent of criminal immunity
as a basis for considering civil immunity and a universal offense as an act that gives rise to tortious damage. The framework was not exhaustive, given the complexities, but the analysis highlighted pivotal inquiries in relation to the chronology
of the looting.
With respect to a suit in an Iraqi court, commencing a civil

272 See supra Parts II, III, IV(B)(4), IV(C)(2) (explaining the international
rules that protect antiquities, string of events that led to an illegal invasion,
and a failure to heed the intelligence warnings about a probable result of societal chaos following invasion, including a failure to adequately respond during an effective occupation after Iraqi security forces were disbanded); Robin
Wright & Ellen Knickmeyer, U.S. Lowers Sights on What Can Be Achieved in
Iraq,
WASH.
POST,
Aug.
14,
2005,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/
13/AR2005081300853.html (remarking that the Bush “administration says
[Hussein] ran down the country. But most damage was from looting” during
the invasion and occupation).
273 In the U.S., individuals can sue on behalf of the U.S. government.
Dan L. Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam Fortune: Do Military Service Members
Have Standing to File Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act?, 34 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 45, 51 (2004). The public treasury benefits by receiving between
70 and 100 percent of the remedy. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2013). There would understandably be collective problems or weak political will to facilitate such an
action in Iraq because most of the population presumably favors post-Hussein
Iraq to Hussein’s rule and there would likely be a dominant perception that a
military invasion was necessary to achieve that circumstance, but this should
not necessarily preclude recovery. If the Iraqi government would not bring
such an action against top Bush Administration officials, Iraq would likely
need some form of qui tam provision.
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case is less of an infringement to official immunity than physically bringing a head of state to another domestic jurisdiction
on criminal charges, as was the context in the ICJ Arrest Warrant case. That unilateral assertion of criminal jurisdiction
would seemingly be restricted on a head of state pursuant to
current norms of customary international law, but indictment
for universal jurisdiction crimes would not be prohibited of
government officials below the head of state and minister of
foreign affairs274 or of the head of state when there is a collective of countries, rather than a unilateral state action, willing
to impose liability on the head of state.275 Moreover, in the context of indicting a head of state on crimes against humanity in
a foreign court, ICJ Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal provided a minority opinion and believed that universal jurisdiction should be permitted in absentia,276 and in 2012,
a specially-constituted fact-finding tribunal in Malaysia found
George W. Bush and other top officials guilty in absentia for
crimes against humanity for developing and executing interrogation programs that consisted of torture.277

274 GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GLOBAL JUSTICE 414 (2013) (noting the applicability of the immunity for
heads of state only while they are in office and that subordinate top-level
state agents have a restrictive immunity for official acts); See supra Part
IV(B)(2).
275 Violations of international law can lead to liability and war crimes do
not only pierce the veil of sovereign immunity, but have also led to personal
culpability for political leaders who carried out those acts. See supra Parts
IV(B)(C). Criminal acts are not clearly official acts of state that should receive sovereign immunity protections, and it may also be reasonable to question whether there should be, first and foremost, a payout for liability from
the state’s public treasury to the degree that the leader acted ultra vires to
the principal populace.
276 Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 16 (Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal).
277 Yvonne Ridley, Bush Convicted of War Crimes in Absentia, FOR.
POLICY J., May 12, 2012 (“In what is the first ever conviction of its kind anywhere in the world, the former US President [Bush] and seven key members
of his administration were . . . found guilty of war crimes” in absentia in Malaysia for war crimes arising out of the torture interrogation programs); See
also Jaclyn Belczyk, Malaysia Rights Group Finds Bush and Associates
Guilty of War Crimes in Symbolic Trial, JURIST, May 11, 2012.
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With respect to a claim being filed in the US, official immunity places limits on plaintiff lawsuits against US officials,278 but there are also substantive policies at stake that
could favor granting compensation for the destruction and theft
of artifacts.279 Another question is whether US courts would
favor equal treatment between foreign and domestic leaders.
The Schooner Exchange (1812) originated the common law
head of state immunity280 and U.S. courts have recently afforded immunity to foreign heads of state in civil suits by deferring

See supra Part IV(C)(1).
International law is well-established as to the right to compensate for
destruction of antiquities and artifacts. Frank G. Fechner, The Fundamental
Aims of Cultural Property Law, 7 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL PROP. 376, 378-80
(1998); David A. Meyer, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and
Its Emergence into Customary International Law, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 349, 38789 (1993). Scholars have expressed there were violations of international law
and requirements to assess liability in the case of the destruction at the Iraq
National Museum. Lucille A. Roussin, Cultural Heritage and Identity, 11
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 707 (2003); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Occupational
Failures and the Legality of Armed Conflict: The Case of Iraqi Cultural Property, OHIO ST. U. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER SERIES No. 23
(2004); Patty Gerstenblith, Legal Damage Control for Iraq’s Looted Cultural
Heritage: The Need for U.S. Import Restrictions, JURIST (Feb. 23, 2004).
Not only is there an obligation to avoid taking positive action that would
destroy property, but there are also obligations to respect and secure cultural
property during war and occupation. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 30, arts. 2-4; Sabine von Schorlemer, Legal
Changes in the Regime of the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, 9 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 43, 45 (2004); Kristen Boon, Legislative Reform in
Post-conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant’s LawMaking Powers, 50 MCGILL L.J. 285, 295 (2005). US law and policy has favored efforts to promote the recovery of Iraqi antiquities. In October 2008,
the U.S. Department of State initiated an Iraq Cultural Heritage Project and
granted $13 million to a non-governmental organization, International Relief
and Development” to assist in rebuilding Iraq’s lost cultural items. Singer,
supra note 110, at 1. George Bush gave Matthew Bogdanos, a U.S. Marine
Reserve colonel and district attorney in New York, the National Humanities
Medal in 2005 for seeking to recover stolen and missing Iraqi antiquities.
Brian Baxter, After Iraq, Lawyers Discuss the Way Forward, THE AMER.
LAWYER, Mar. 27, 2013, available at http://www.reedsmith.com/files/
News/ea8df378-37c3-4f93-8595-dcc54458ccc2/Presentation/NewsAttachment/
58711b03-338c-40d1-9f04-e11836367f25/After%20Iraq%20Lawyers
%20Discuss%20Way%20Forward.pdf.
280 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
278
279
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first to the US executive’s position if the executive spoke on the
issue of immunity in cases such as Lafontant v. Aristide281 and
Tachiona v. Mugabe,282 and initially in Estate of Domingo v.
Republic of the Philippines.283 However, in other cases, U.S.
courts have not granted immunity to foreign heads of state in
civil cases for wrongful acts taken while serving in the official
capacity as a foreign head of state.284 Most recently, the Supreme Court decided Samatar v. Yousuf (2010) and held that
individual foreign government officials and employees do not
have FSIA immunity and that U.S. courts might exercise jurisdiction over an individual who had been prime minister and
held other cabinet positions while purportedly committing hu281 Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 130-31, 139–40 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) (noting that the executive position of granting head of state immunity
prevails in a case involving a plaintiff suing President Aristide for allegedly
ordering the execution of the plaintiff’s husband).
282 Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 264-65, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(with U.S. executive encouragement, dismissing plaintiff’s civil case for alleged torture, execution, and other crimes ordered by top officials).
283 Estate of Domingo v. Republic of the Philippines, 694 F. Supp. 782,
786 (W.D. Wash. 1982). The immunity was waived in the later case. In re
Doe, 860 F.2d at 45. In 1986, President Corazon Aquino granted broad power
to investigate the human rights abuses during the 1976-1986 dictatorship of
Ferdinand Marcos, but the committee never provided a final report. Van
Dyke, supra note 159, at 157. Instead 9,531 victims of human rights abuses
have been seeking compensation by litigating claims against Marco’s Estate.
Id. at 156. The estate paid $10 million to thousands of Filipino victims after
prevailing in a 2011 class-action judgment in federal court in Hawaii. James
C. McKinley Jr., After Conviction, Focus Turns to Ownership of Marcos Artwork,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
22,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/nyregion/after-conviction-focus-turns-torightful-ownership-of-marcos-art.html. It may also be controversial that the
US government supported Marcos, the US military had bases in the Philippines when Marcos suspended the constitution and democracy to make himself a dictator, and the military supported the coup. Bejesky, Politico, supra
note 209, at 55-56. Yet US courts had questions about whether the official
immunity should be recognized in the US.
284 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying head of
state immunity to Radovan Karadžić); United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d
1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that Noriega was not entitled to immunity because he was not constitutionally elected, Panama did not seek immunity, and personal acts with drug trafficking were at issue); See also In re Doe,
860 F.2d at 45. Other than Kadic v. Karadžić, these cases might be distinguished from the deeper gravity of harm that coexists with war crimes.
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man rights atrocities against the plaintiffs.285 If U.S. courts
are open to holding individual foreign heads of state civilly responsible, perhaps it is reasonable to not oppose the domestic
or foreign courts from holding a top U.S. government official
civilly responsible for universal wrongs.286

285 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282 (2010); This is a change in
the law that addressed a split among the federal circuits. PETER HENNER,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: LAW, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
259-60 (2009) (explaining that there was a split in the federal circuits over
whether plaintiffs can attain jurisdiction over individual foreign officials under FSIA).
286 However, a key element has been whether the home jurisdiction of the
head of state permits the suit in the foreign court. Lafontant v. Aristide, 844
F. Supp. at 130-31, 139–40. Unless a current or future president strips former President Bush of immunity, a civil claim of liability would be less likely
to proceed in a foreign court, although the immunity is not so clear with subordinate officials.
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